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MARKETS, SOCIAL NORMS, AND GOVERNMENTS IN
THE SERVICE OF ENVIRONMENTALLY SUSTAINABLE
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Christopher B. Barrett

ABSTRACT

/

MARKETS, SOCIAL NORMS, AND GOVERNMENTS IN
THE SERVICE OF ENVIRONMENTALLY SUSTAINABLE
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT l

The concepts "stewardship" and "sustainable development" arise frequently in contemporary
work on environnlental protection and economic development. The considerable variation in the use
of the concepts, however, largely reflects the commentators' different and often hidden normative
axioms. This paper highlights several distinct, influential normative traditions and explains how
together these point toward lTIultiple institutional channels to meet contelTIpOrary environmental
challenges. My own perspective is that of a development economist with research interests in
agricultural development and poverty alleviation in poor comnlunities. So in this paper I concentrate
on low- and middle-income countries-which account for 85% of the world's population and 76%
of its inhabited land mass-and hence on the "green" issues of renewable resource management that
disproportionately affect poor rural populations in the low-income world more so than on "brown"
issues of pollution and waste disposal more pressing to urban folk and the industrial world.

I. Distinct Normative Approaches
Economics, ecology, and ecumenism all derive from the Greek word aikas, nleanlng
household, but by no nleans share the same assunlptions of what is essential or desirable. Our
disciplinary traditions often cloud our ability to understand why others might reasonably take a
different approach. This section briefly maps out some useful core principles of and fundamental
IAn earlier version of this paper was prepared for the conference "Global Stewardship: From the Academy To
the Public Square," in Gloucester, MA, October 1996, sponsored by the Coalition for Christian Colleges and Universities
and the Pew Charitable Trusts, and hosted by Gordon College. I thank participants at that gathering, Clara Barrett, Ray
Grizzle, and Dwight Israelsen, for stimulating conversations and comments that influenced this paper. This work was
generously supported by the Pew Global Stewardship Initiative, a Pew Evangelical Scholars Fellowship, and the Utah
Agricultural Experiment Station. Approved as UAES journal paper No . 5006.
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differences between econolnic, ecological, and ecumenical Christian perspectives on sustainable
developn1ent and stewardship. My goal here is to distill the core normative principles of these
perspectives not to provide a comprehensive survey.

A. Economics
Economists occupy privileged positions in contemporary policy debates, including those
concerning the environment. This is particularly evident in debates surrounding "sustainable
development," suddenly a central theme of the foreign policy of wealthy, industrial nations, of
developn1ent lending by multilateral organizations, and of the conservation strategies of international
environmental groups. Perhaps the Inost commonly cited definition of "sustainable development"
is that of the Bnlndtland Commission: "development that Ineets the needs of the present without
cOlnprolnising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (WCED 1987, p. 43). This
definition slunmarizes a generation of economic thinking about enviromnental protection as
fundaInentally a question of optilnal intertemporal n1anagement of natural resources.
But the element of the Brundtland Commission definition on which most scholars and
policYlnakers has seized is its explicit adoption of intergenerational equity as the core normative
axioln of sustainable development. It is easy to see why this mandates enviromnental protection.
Nondeclining future per capita incomes and standards of living depend on a nondeclining stock of
productive capital. Since some capital stock depreciates naturally, sustainable developn1ent requires
substitution for consumed, nom-enewable natural resources, and investment in those substitutes at
no less than the rate of simultaneous depletion of environmental resources (Georgescu-Roegen 1971;
Daly and Cobb 1989; Perrings 1996). As awareness of the cOlnplex fabric of ecosystems has

/
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increased, however, economists' confidence in the substitutability between fOnTIS of capital has
dilninished. While some substitution possibilities are feasible (e.g., solar energy from photovoltaic
cells in place of energy produced by burning fossil fuels), we have become increasingly cautious
about environmental destruction and manufactured replacement as a sustainable patteDl of resource
use. So economists have become increasingly cognizant that conservation of natural capital is
central to intergenerational equity and to the optimal management of a resource.
But why emphasize intergenerational equity over intragenerational equity? lfthe goal is to
make possible for others what is possible for us-a variant of the golden rule-the principle applies
no less within contemporary society than across sequenced societies, a point regrettably ignored in
most contemporary writing on sustainable development. This oversight matters, since the poor are
both victilns and agents of enviromnental degradation (Barrett 1996). Basing the sustainable
/

development ethic on intergenerational equity seems an arbitrary and incomplete social philosophy.
The more useful economic principle embodied in the Brundtland Commission definition is
that ofParetian efficiency: we must not waste resources in the process of meeting the needs of the
present generation. A distribution is "Pareto efficient" if and only if no one could be better off
without making at least one person worse off. It is rare, however, to find changes that would not
make at least one person worse off, so the Pareto criterion in its strict sense is relatively useless.
More useful is the concept of "potential" Pareto improvements, combined with the compensation
principle, wherein gainers fully compensate the losers from a particular policy refoDll. 2 Pareto
efficiency and cOlnpetitive market equilibria are logically equivalent under particular, common

2W ithout compensation, the potential Pareto principle reduces to utilitarianism.
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assumptions. 3 This equivalency between cOlnpetitive market equilibria and efficiency motivates
economists ' heavy reliance on n1arkets as mechanisms for allocating scarce resources of all kinds.
Market prices playa central role in efficient allocation across space and time. But problems
arise under three common circumstances: in the presence of externalities that drive a wedge between
private and social valuation, in the absence of markets and observable prices, and in the face of
uncertainty against which one cannot fully insure (e.g., the environmental impacts of irreversible
developn1ent) .
Exten1alities, the absence of markets and observable pnces, uncertainty, imperfect
substitutability, and the dynamic interdependence of systems weaken the textbook case for free
n1arkets but do not fundamentally alter the central importance of efficiency, as quite distinct from
the market mechanism used to foster efficiency. These merely complicate the computation of costs
J

and benefits necessary to establish the availability of potential Pareto improvements and create the
space for nonmarket institutions-social norms and governn1ents, in particular-to play an important
role in efficient resource allocation. The key normative criterion contributed by economics is not
the intergenerational equity but the more fundamental principle of efficiency.

B. Ecology
The anthropocentric line of economic reasoning described above understandably disturbs
Inany ecologists, conservation biologists, and ethicists who find intrinsic value in nature itself, not
just instnlmental value derived from nature's capacity to satisfy human needs and wants. Objecting
to environmental managelnent based solely on human valuation of natural resources, commentators

3This relationship's high status within the discipline is clearly reflected by its label: the First and Second
Theorems of Welfare Economics.
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routinely emphasize that humans are merely a part of a complex ecosystem that influences us as
much as we influence it. As a species, we have been relatively slow to recognize the importance of
con1l11unity between humankind and otherkind and to therefore take greater care in our treatment of
the rest of Creation. Perhaps Sagoff (1995, p. 618) sums this sentiment up best: "[t]he reasons to
protect nature are moral, religious, and cultural far more often than they are economic." I would
largely agree with this claim, while pointing out that while the reasons to protect nature may be
largely noneconomic, in a fallen world the means to do so rely (perhaps distressingly) more on
econOlnlcs.
Irrespective of the rights of other kind, humans design and implement efforts to steward the
biosphere. Allowing for even the slightest human free agency and sinfulness, getting hun1an
incentives right is a necessary condition to environmentally sustainable behaviors, regardless of the
/

morally appropriate allocation of rights. If we are to recognize the coevolutionary nature of all
Creation-hulnankind and otherkind-in all of the small, daily choices that collectively leave a
considerable human footprint on the biosphere, incentives have got to guide hun1an behaviors in
appropriate directions.

Markets, influenced by governments and by the social norms of

con1munities, establish those incentives.
The anthropocentric arrogance rightly challenged by many conservationists is too often
mirrored by "green imperialism" on the part of conservation groups. The gazetting of parks in the
low-income world and various other initiatives born of western environmental campaigns too often
alnount to little more than a wealthy population's ilnposition of its values on a distant poor
population that bears Inost of the costs of conservation. As David CUlnming of the Worldwide Fund
for Nature recognizes, "Only in Britain and America do people mistake anin1al welfare for

6

conservation. To force western values on African culture is cultural imperialism" (as quoted in The

Economist, Sept. 7, 1996, p. 15). The principle of humility is central to the concept of community.
Humility must be reflected in method as well. Mainstream economists tend to build
universal models based on micro-scale theories of the consumer and of the firm. Systems ecologists,
on the other hand, are more inclined to deemphasize individual members of species and to express
concern about large-scale systems (Norton and Toman 1997). A more promising and recent
perspective emerges from hierarchical systems, which nest smaller scale systems within larger scale
ones (Common and Perrings 1992; Holling 1992, 1994; Norton 1992), debunking the notion that the
luacrocosm mirrors the microcosm. An understanding of small-scale dynamics does not imply an
understanding of large-scale ones, nor vice versa.
The crucial normative axiom emerging from the ecological sciences is that of community,
/

and, derivatively, humility regarding our place in the biosphere. The very dependence of humanity
on the rest of creation and the intrinsic worth of nature should imbue us with appropriate caution.
An aXi0111 of conlluunity does not, however, absolve us of the need to make conservation consistent
with hUluans' imperfect aspirations nor of the need to satisfy aspirations in the lUOSt efficient nlanner
possible.

7

C. Christian4
There is no single "Christian" environmentalism today, but rather a rich diversity of
approaches. These are perhaps best recognized as the embodiment ofSt. Paul's (1 Corinthians 12)
insight that we are many parts of one body (Grizzle and Barrett 1998). The econon1ic and ecology
paradign1s crudely mapped above offer distinct, fundamental truths, but neither can stand fully on
its own.

Christian environmentalism is gradually evolving toward a more holistic approach

incorporating the ethics of efficiency and community and adding to these a cornerstone principle of
Christianity: compassion. Christ directs His followers to feel the pain of those who suffer and to
attend to their needs. Simply put, Christians must heal the suffering of creation, both its human and
nonhuman components. Compassion is a call to seek justice.
The axiom of compassion adds value those of community and efficiency. Recognition of
/

interdependence within a community, even of moral equality, stops short of motivating action to
remedy identifiable problelTIs. Meanwhile, efficiency generally concentrates on the procedural
justice of cOlTIpetitive markets, ignoring issues of ex ante distributional justice (are initial
distributions fair?) and, as a consequence, of ex post distributional justice. 5

The axiom of

compassion fills these notable voids and, together with community and efficiency, creates a set of
useful axioms with which we can define and pursue environmentally sustainable economic
development.

4While I suspect the principles discussed in this section apply to many non-Christian faiths , I am only able to
speak competently to my own religion's perspective on the biosphere.
5Barrett (1996, 1997a) advocates "fairness" theory as a way to include both distributional and procedural justice
considerations in economic theorizing about sustainable development.
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The Christian tradition is also explicitly pluralistic, admitting multiple principles to guide
behavior. Jesus explicitly rej ected moral monism when challenged to single out the greatest of all
commandlnents, replying instead that there are two fundamental principles (Mark 12:28-31). There
is considerable and growing support for a similarly pluralistic approach to contemporary
environmental issues (Norton 1995; Norton and Toman 1997; Barrett and Grizzle forthcoming;
Grizzle and Barrett 1998).
Pluralism poses two major challenges. First, all parties must maintain a commitment to open,
respectful dialogue. Pluralism thus favors participatory methods to identify and analyze challenges,
and to propose, design, implement, and evaluate prospective solutions. Decision making necessarily
beconles more local, with policy making done "from the bottom up," following the principle of
subsidiarity.

Environmental policy is becoming more participatory and more local, perhaps
J

especially in low-income agrarian communities in which global environmental challenges of
biodiversity loss and deforestation are paramount (Wells, Brandon, and Hannah 1992; Western,
Wright, and Strum 1994). The dictum "think globally, act locally" encourages community-based
activism, and the evidence in both the social and biological sciences is that pluralistic approaches
are more effective than monistic ones in combating serious problems (Barrett and Csete 1994;
Western, Wright, and Strum 1994).
The second maj or challenge is the need for multiple accounting systems and decision rules
corresponding to the multiple axioms underpinning choice (Norton and Toman 1997). This
necessarily requires parallel efforts at understanding the same phenomena or alternatives from
different perspectives. A pluralistic system will not likely be a least-cost means to Inake decisions
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about the environment, 6 but it is perhaps best suited to an adaptive management paradigm (Holling
1978), explicitly recognizing both the depth of our ignorance about inherently unceliain ecological
relationships and the considerable value of infolwation that can help reduce that uncertainty.

D. Pluralistic Stewardship 7
The concept of "pluralistic stewardship" offers a helpful means to reconcile the potentially
complenlentary axioms of efficiency, community, and compassion. Stewardship holds that the
possessor of a natural resource should behave as a custodian, using the resource wisely but enjoined
fro In destnlction or disposal. Stewardship of creation, i.e., of the full array of human and nonhuman
biota and abiota, combines efficiency and compassion, in its mandate of wise resource use on behalf
of all creation, with community in its denial of individual ownership of all possible rights in
property, most notably the right of destruction. Stewardship identifies possessors as managers,
servants, and beneficiaries rather than as masters.
Stewardship necessarily limits propeliy rights, denying the Lockean tradition of ownership
that lies at the core of western market economies, wherein a full suite of property rights (i.e.,
including rights to destruction and disposal) derives from the application of human labor effort to
a hithelio unclainled resource. Stewardship resembles nlore closely Inany communal tenure regilnes,
wherein exclusive rights to use and even to transfer a resource (particularly by bequest) accrue to the
person who first domesticates it. Property rights are social constructions; ownership must be
recognized and enforced within a society, whether by a state with police powers or by elders with
6Note that "least cost" and "most efficient" are often mistakenly treated as synonymous in the popular press.
The most efficient solution maximizes net benefits (total benefits less total costs), i.e. , it exhibits zero net marginal cost,
which is different than zero total cost.
7This term originates with Barrett and Grizzle (forthcoming).

I,.
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moral authority. There is nothing fundamental to rights systems that necessitates ubiquitous private
ownership of natural resources. This in no way denies the strong efficiency arguments favoring
private property rights associated with possession (see section ITA on markets).

Pluralistic

stewardship merely lilnits the extent of those rights in order to recognize that compassion and
cOlmnunity are normative axioms not dominated by the axiom of efficiency.

II. Information Channels and Incentive Mechanisms

Articulating normative axioms is necessary but insufficient to advancing the goal of
environmentally sustainable economic development. Implementation must be canied out by humans
needing reliable and timely information available on which to base decisions, and facing incentives
that n1ust induce them to behave in a manner consistent with socially agreed normative axioms.
Human decision making is framed by three broad classes of institutions that guide
infolmation flow and incentives: markets, social norms, and governments. Each employs a different
enforcement mechanism to influence individual choice. Social norms invoke conscience and peer
pressure, governments rely on police and taxation powers, and n1arkets employ individual's
self-interest. These are thus best viewed as complementary institutions that society can shape so as
to facilitate economic development and environmental protection (Banett 1997 a, 1997b; Banett and
Grizzle forthcoming). As Anow et al. (1995, p. 520) put it, "The solution to environmental
degradation lies in such institutional reforms as would compel private users of environmental
resources to take account of the social costs of their actions." This section discusses each of these
three broad institutions and why all three are necessary to advance pluralistic stewardship.

/
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A. Markets
Markets are inherently pluralistic institutions. Indeed, markets are interesting and important
precisely because they encourage interaction and coordination within a society comprised of
individuals possessing different information, abilities, and preferences. Minority viewpoints have
as much standing in a n1arket as majority viewpoints. By offering mutually beneficial exchange,
markets provide a means to articulate and accommodate plural interests. Individuals are part of a
complex system of production, consumption, and exchange, a material ecosystem of sorts. When
competitive, markets are one of the best known means to limit the concentration and abuse of
individual power.
Perhaps markets' most important function is to provide information essential to the efficient
allocation of resources to their most valuable uses through price signals of relative scarcity. The
/

prices heterogeneous people and firms are willing to accept or pay offer a useful summary statistic
for relative value in luarkets in which inforn1ation flows freely. Complete competitive markets
generate price signals that yield Pareto efficient equilibria. Moreover, price signals induce much
nonrandom resource substitution, technological advance, and scientific discovery to improve
resource management (Binswanger and Ruttan 1978). When markets function properly, increasing
resource scarcity naturally increases the returns to inventions that conserve, substitute for or discover
new stocks of threatened natural capital.
Increased relative scarcity occurs either because of increased demand or decreased supply.
As incomes and public awareness of limited ecological resilience increase, luore people place greater
intrinsic value on environmental protection and demand for natural resources increases, driving up
their prices and encouraging their conservation. Similarly, increased perception of resource scarcity,

12
caused by depletion or by scientific findings that increase estimated minimum sustainable stocks
(ecological resilience), raises resource prices and encourages voluntary conservation. Both demand
and supply-side impulses encourage creative conservation innovations and the transfer of resource
use rights to those who best conserve the resource. This is apparent in the rapid and widespread
emergence of wildlife ranches in eastern and southern Africa, and in the increasingly common
purchase of land by environmental nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that subsequently
convert the area into reserves. Competitive markets facilitate conservation.
Controlled markets, by contrast, distort prices, often discouraging conservation and
promoting unsustainable rates of resource exploitation. This is the experience of most centrally
planned economies. Industries in China and eastern Europe generated unprecedented air pollution
because they were directed to produce a certain volume of manufactures, without competition from
J

foreign imports, and using coal-generated energy priced below cost. Administrative pricing and
regulated production and trade patterns distort the information and incentives available to microlevel decision makers. When combined with ancillary interventions to ensure the most vulnerable
and resource-dependent members of society can share in the benefits, market-oriented economic
liberalization can thus be socially and enviromnentally beneficial (Barrett and Carter forthcoming).
Competitive markets are not free nor do they emerge spontaneously; they are expensive
social constructions wherein individuals come together freely to transfer rights over the future value
of an object or service (Polanyi 1957; Bromley 1991). Competitive markets thus require low
transactions costs that permit a well-defined and defended system of transferable property rights, and
mature financial systems to facilitate exchange. Hence the intrinsic interdependency between
markets, social nonns, and government.

13

Property rights make individuals accountable for their actions and thereby create incentives
for resource conservation or transfer. It is because the principle of accountability underlies an
effective system of property rights that state ownership generally fails, especially with a powerful
state not beholden to its constituents. Property rights are most effective when parties' rights can be
enforced and exchanged.

Any of several kinds of tenurial regImes-e.g., private property,

co-management, etc.-can offer clearly defined, protected, and transferable private usufructure rights
that foster efficient and equitable resource management (Baland and Platteau 1996; Hanna 1996).
The in1portance of transactions costs has long been recognized in economics (Coase 1960)
and is the central theme of the new institutional economics (Bromley 1989, 1991; North 1991;
Platteau 1994a, 1994b). Hill (1994, p. 124) points to transaction costs as "the reason for the
divergence between private actions and social consequences .... Ifwe think of transaction costs
J

as the costs of defining and enforcing rights and carrying out exchanges, it obvious that these costs
are much higher with some resources, such as air, than with others, such as land. We fail to have
fully defined rights over certain resources because of high transaction costs, and in those cases the
unfettered interaction of individuals will not produce the socially desirable amount of activity"
(emphasis in original). Higher transaction costs lead to less complete sets of property rights and less
efficient exchange of existing rights, with the consequence that more natural resources fall prey to
overexploitation. Transactions costs are particularly high in the low-incolue agrarian nations of the
tropics, leading to poorly defined and enforced systems of property rights, limited exchange
opportunities, incomplete and noncompetitive markets, and a dangerously rapid rate of deforestation,
desertification, biodiversity depletion, topsoil erosion, and air and water pollution.
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Transactions costs are high in the absence of well-functioning communications and transport
networks-the physical infrastructure of an economy-or of a mature legal system and a free
press-the institutional infrastnlcture of an economy-to produce clear and consistent definition,
enforcement, and transferability of property rights. Moreover, all well-functioning market systems
have depended on pervasive generalized morality (Bromley 1989; North 1991; Evensky 1993;
Platteau 1994a, 1994b; Barrett 1997b). Interpersonal trust and social networks founded on trust
permit low-cost transactions, efficient division of labor according to comparative advantage, and
higher rates of investment and innovation.
Financial markets are of special importance because they permit borrowing and saving to
finance the purchase of durable property rights, and they enable individuals to insure against risks
that might otherwise impede investment and resource conservation. The absence of well-functioning
/

fmanciallnarkets for saving, credit, and insurance often fosters excessive resource exploitation. For
example, pastoralists who cannot reliably save in or borrow from a banking system have a tendency
to overstock pasture, leading to increasingly fragile range ecology and greater risk of livestock dieoffs (Coppock 1994). Similarly, insufficient access to credit or insurance to allow peasant farn1ers
to mitigate price risk in staple foodstuffs increases incentives to undertake destructive slash-and-burn
farming (Barrett 1998a). By contrast, debt-for-nature swaps executed by international environmental
NGOs have helped protect millions of hectares of ecologically valuable forest and rangeland in the
low-income tropics over the past decade only because secondary markets in sovereign debt emerged
in a competitive international financial market.
For all their virtues of promoting efficiency and community, markets are not especially wellsuited to advancing the goal of compassion. This threatens the environment because the poor are
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both the principle victims and the primary destroyers of natural capital in the low-income tropics
(Perrings 1989, 1996; World Bank 1992; Reardon and Vosti 1995; Barrett 1996, 1997a, 1998a;
Barrett and Arcese 1995, 1998). Deforestation, wildlife poaching that threatens biodiversity loss,
overgrazing that facilitates erosion and habitat destruction, and other unsustainable exploitations of
renewable resources too often result from one billion poor peoples' daily struggle to survive.
Attelnpts at resource conservation today may be futile in the absence of measures to combat poverty
since "for the environment, destitution is far worse than economic development" (Sagoff 1995,
p. 616). More optimistically, the World Bank (1992, p. 1) asserts, "there are strong 'win-win'
0ppoliunities that remain unexploited. The most important of these relates to poverty reduction; not
only is attacking poverty a moral imperative, but it is also essential for environmental stewardship."
The good news is that futile experimentation with state-directed resource allocation is now a thing
./

of the past, and there are widespread good faith efforts at building authentically competitive markets
based on well-defined systems of property rights and low transaction costs. The movement toward
n1arkets in the low-income world is desirable, well under way, and likely irreversible.

B. Social Norms
Social norms are the standards of conduct and moral judgements collectively espoused by
individuals within a society. The cultivation and maintenance of norms that celebrate the axioms
of efficiency, community, and compassion are thus obvious means by which contemporary society
can operationalize stewardship. Norms are necessary to pluralistic stewardship because a wildly
uneven distribution of decision-nlaking power endows a small subpopulation of humans with
virtually unchecked discretion over creation. Markets and governments can limit the damage done
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directly or indirectly by this cohort (of which we are certainly a part), but those formal institutions
are rarely sufficient to prevent catastrophic, irreversible environmental damage.

Moreover,

governments and markets are weakest in precisely those parts of the low-income world where
renewable resource depletion is of greatest concern.
Thankfully, many individuals and cultures already adhere to a strong ecological ethic,
although, regrettably, economic and governmental forces sometimes erode these traditions.
Indi vidual conscience and social stigIna can serve to enforce norms of efficiency, humility, and
compassion where economic and legal institutions cannot. The more social scientists study social
behavior applied to common property resources, the more we realize the importance of what Cordell
and McKean (1992, p. 191) observe in Brazil to be an ethical code "far more binding on individual
conSCIence than any government regulations ever could be."g Thus, a "central objective of
./

environmental protection movements must be to define and promote a holistic ecological ethic so
as to enlarge the population which values environmental protection and the satisfaction of basic
human needs sufficiently to generate an environmentally and socially sustainable society" (Barrett
and Grizzle forthcoming).
Social norms have direct and obvious value to stewardship because they encourage
individuals to exercise compassion and humility. Economic theory tells us that some "public" goods
will be severely undersupplied by markets because the provider of public goods cannot exclude
others from enjoying their benefits. Marginal private benefits are thus less than marginal social
benefits of public goods investlnent, leading to socially suboptimal supply.

There are many

80 strom (1990) and Bromley (1992) offer excellent summaries of this rapidly emerging literature. Dasgupta
(1993) offers an excellent discussion of the importance and power of internalized norms, and Putnam (1993) offers
fascinating insights on the value of persistent civic-mindedness in democratic society.
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examples, however, of public goods that are plentifully supplied by private donor-investors: e.g.,
community leadership or houses of religious worship. Individuals often pay for such amenities out
of a sense of duty as much as because they are maximizing their own welfare (Barrett 1998b).
Just as the empirical evidence does not fully support the neoclassical prediction that public
goods should always and everywhere be severely undersupplied, so too does the evidence fail to
support the popular prediction that common property resources will always be overexploited.
Overexploitation of open access resources occurs much less so than "the tragedy of the conunons"
predicts. A better understanding of why individuals voluntarily exercise restraint is of potentially
enormous importance to the task of pluralistic stewardship. Evolutionary game theorists are finding
that social systems exhibit lllultiple stable equilibria, including not only those characterized by the
tragedy of the commons, in which individualistic behavior leads to resource overexploitation, but
/

also a norm-guided society of cooperation, individual restraint, and decentralized enforcement of
codes of conduct (Platteau 1994a, 1994b; Baland and Platteau 1996; Sethi and SOlllanathan 1996).
The key to realizing the latter, preferable equilibriuIll is that a sufficient proportion of society acts
cooperatively so that this behavior persists in the face of idiosyncratic violation by a minority.
Hence, the illlportance of promoting ecological ethics of the sort captured in the popular
nlaxim "think globally, act locally." In the face of increased individual mobility that decreases
communities' capacity to induce cooperative individual behavior by sanctioning transgressors, it
beconles all the more important to instill in people a strong self-directed ethic of stewardship.
Toward that end, Nash (1991) advances a set of nine "ecological virtues," which he describes as
"patterns of personal and social perspective and behavior that, if followed, can make ecological
integrity a reality."

18
The good news is that such virtues are being actively promoted in churches, schools, and
local gathering places throughout the world. There has been a stunning shift in perspective regarding
humanity's place in and responsibilities to creation in the past generation. Anyone who spends time
in elementary or secondary schools, in this country and n1any others, cannot help but come away
impressed by the depth and sincerity of the environmental stewardship convictions held and
expressed by today's children. While some of this innocent idealism will surely tarnish as they age,
I retain great hope that we are helping our children learn early the lessons we and our parents

discovered rather late: that we need to think globally and act locally.
Social norms also have instrumental value through their facilitation of competitive markets
and good governance. As discussed already, efficient markets depend on a generalized morality.
Although rarely recognized by those who most frequently invoke his writings, Adam Smith
J

advocated a market economy not because he believed in its inherent virtue, but because he believed
most people were sufficiently virtuous to Inake market exchange feasible and that the police power
of the state could satisfactorily contain the damage done by the rest. Indeed, in his Theory ofMoral

Sentiments, Smith emphasized the superiority of assistance "reciprocally afforded from love, from
gratitude, from friendship, and esteem" as the root of a flourishing society. Recognizing, however,
that "man has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren, and it is vain for him to expect
it frOln their benevolence only," Smith saw an important role for self-interested behavior as well,
hence his fan10us "invisible hand" n1etaphor. In Smith's view, a market-based "society, though less
happy and agreeable, ... may subsist ... by a mercenary exchange of good offices accordingly to
an agreed valuation." The virtue of markets, in the authentic Smithian view, is that they are
participatory, encouraging free and frequent human interaction that induces ilIDovation and requires
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honest behavior to maintain associates' trust. Simply put, Smith saw a market economy founded
on social norms as more compatible with the other necessary ingredients of a moral society than the
feudal or mercantilist systelus familiar to eighteenth century England.
The norn1S prevailing in a society also underpin its governance. Widely held perceptions of
what is fair behavior limit potential abuses of power. Procedural legitimacy is necessary for the
sustainability of any human institution. Violence, towards the poor or the environment, feeds on
silence; it is overcome through advocacy and dialogue.
Social norms in tum depend on markets and governments. While love is the greatest virtue,
it may also be the scarcest, and we must therefore economize on its use where we can. This is the
point of the earlier quote by Adam Smith in his famous argument for free markets, which lessen
individuals' dependence on others' benevolence. Moreover, competitive markets and participatory
J

governance facilitate regular human contact that helps feed compassion and a commitment to
pluralism.
Governments, meanwhile, help ensure satisfactory provision of public goods in information,
law enforcement, and education, which help shape and buttress the norms prevailing in a society.
The legal and regulatory systems of the state also articulate and enforce codes of conduct, thereby
setting uniforn1 public standards on matters of broad agreement. Among the most important
safeguards a government can defend are the rights to free speech and religious tolerance, for the
defense of luinority views and interests is crucial to the persistence of authentically pluralistic
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systems. This checks the tendency of social norms to mutate into ideologies that can become
oppressi ve rather than liberating.
Governments also have an important role in cushioning against shocks, both domestically
and internationally. The severe dislocations involved in rapid sociopolitical transitions in Europe,
Africa, and Latin America, and the apparent rapid rise in crime and predatory behavior are disturbing
examples of what can happen when governments beCOlne impotent in a tilne of swift change. Where
national govermnents have been unable to cushion their citizens from dramatic change, the
international community has a practical need as well as a moral obligation to assist. As economies
integrate internationally and communities become less isolated from external cultures, hannonization
of international codes of conduct becomes crucial to maintaining stable, cooperative social systems.
The easier it becomes to escape social sanction, the less likely is a system to evolve toward a
/

norm-guided equilibrium in which individuals transcend purely self-interested welfare maximization
to behave in a socially optimal fashion. Isolationist policies are a clear threat to the establishment
and maintenance of universal norms that must underpin environmentally sustainable development.
Many of the most pressing contemporary environmental challenges-biodiversity loss,
deforestation, desertification, soil erosion-are most acute where markets and governments are
weakest. Individuals nlust nonetheless have an impulse to steward resources without the lure of
profit or the threat of government penalty. Hence, the urgent need to cultivate universal norms of
pluralistic stewardship within ourselves, our churches, our civic institutions, and our children.

C. Governments

The traditional economic view is that the appropriate role of government is to correct market
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failures and to provide public goods. Unfortunately, many states have failed to do those two things
well with serious consequences, and, as a consequence, governments are under attack in most places.
Nonetheless, governments have crucial roles to play in the task of pluralistic stewardship. While
ilnproving the quality of governance is a desirable objective, we need to take care not to destroy the
credibility and authority of govermnents in the process of reforming them.
Markets founded on self-interested, optimizing behavior will generally not lead to an efficient
allocation of resources in the presence of externalities. Governments can eliminate externalities
through taxes or subsidies to equate private and social costs and benefits. Theory tells us taxes and
subsidies will usually be more efficient than regulatory prohibitions. But where uncertainty abounds,
then there may be a sound basis for regulation according to the precautionary principle (Bishop
1978). This principle is the basis for safe minimum standards to minimize downside risk associated
/

with potentially catastrophic events.
Public goods are a very special type of externality associated with goods that are "nonrival"
(lnany individuals can enjoy it without dilninishing another's consumption) and "nonexcludable."
Governments need to provide public goods that fulfill five important objectives: (i) to facilitate low
transactions costs that enable the definition, enforcement, and exchange of property rights; (ii) to
improve information on and understanding of the relationship between human society and the
broader ecosystems of which we are a part; (iii) to defend competitive markets; (iv) to ensure
Inacroeconolnic stability; and (v) to cushion society against shocks, providing social safety nets and
transfers as needed.

Having already discussed the provision of physical and institutional

infrastructure to reduce transactions costs, let us now tum to these other four missions.
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Reliable and timely infonnation properly understood is fundamental to making efficient and
compassionate choices. Research and education are the principal means by which societies produce
infonnation and understanding. The empirical evidence strongly suggests that basic research and
training is distinctly undersupplied by private sources, yielding extraordinarily high annual rates of
return to public research and training. The more we study ecosystems and their linkages to
socioeconomic systems, the more we learn about how resilient or fragile each system is to distinct
types of perturbations and the better equipped we become to steward creation. Recent initiatives to
fully integrate environmental sustainability questions into more traditional lines of research in
engineering and the social sciences deserve considerable attention and support. Governments must
be renlinded regularly of the wisdom of investing in the public goods of research and education.
Governments must also defend the competitiveness of markets through active antitrust
/

enforcement, now largely absent in the low- and middle-income world. Defense of competitive
markets also demands state restraint from administrative pricing, unnecessarily distortionary
taxation, and barriers to domestic and international flows of goods, services, and people.
Restrictions on trade and immigration result primarily in the immiseration of populations in
low -income economies, inducing their increased overexp loi tation of renewab Ie resources, in part due
to greater use of older and "dirtier" technologies. On balance, free trade is a friend to the poor and
to the environment in most of the world.
The fourth public good that governments need to deliver is a stable macroeconomic
enviromnent for private decision makers. A key lesson of the generation of macroeconomic policy
nlaking in Africa and Latin America from the mid-1960s through the mid-1980s is that lax fiscal and
monetary policies generate high and volatile inflation rates and weak financial systenls, undercutting
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incentives to save and invest, degrading real wages, and thereby hurting the poor and sparking
excessive natural resource exploitation.

Prudent macroeconomic management is central to

sustainable development (Gandhi 1996).
Necessary macroeconomic liberalization in most of the low- and middle-income world needs,
however, to be reconciled with the preexisting institutional shortcomings of low-income nations.
We live in what economists call a "second-best" world, i.e., one tainted by the imperfections inherent
to original sin. This is one reason why the first order of business in most of Sub-Saharan Africa and
many other desperately poor parts of the world should be microeconomic and institutional reforms
to reduce transaction costs, extend property rights coverage, foster competitive markets, and increase
the supply of necessary public goods. In the absence of ancillary investments, macroeconomic and
sectoral liberalization reforms can cause significant and unanticipated environmental and human
J

injury (Barrett and Carter forthcoming; Maler and Munasinghe 1996; Opschoor and Jognma 1996).
Macroeconomic stability is necessary but not sufficient to sustainable development.
Finally, governments must ensure the existence of social safety nets that guarantee all persons
access to a minilTIum level of food, clean water, clothing, and shelter necessary for survival. Where
communities do not protect the vulnerable, the state must, out of compassion for both humans and
the environment. When their brothers and sisters will not support them, the poor tum to nature, often
in a quite unsustainable manner, through resource exploitation and procreation. Both theory and
empirical evidence suggest that social safety nets reduce the need of poor populations to resort to
environmental predation (Bluffstone 1995; Barrett 1998a; Barrett and Arcese 1998). Fiscally
strapped low-income country governments rarely can afford to provide complete safety nets, hence
the need for foreign assistance to poor communities worldwide in recognition of international
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interdependency in ecological and economic systems. Unfortunately, the opposite is occurring;
already low-aid budgets are dwindling rapidly. While poor countries struggle to pay for food,
Inedicines, and school books to meet their populations' most basic human needs, wealthy nations
that can afford to underwrite necessary investments in environmental protection have been
disgracefully slow to offer more than rhetorical support. Kenya, for instance, a nation with an annual
per capita income of less than $300, sacrifices approximately $200 million annually to conserve
biodiversity through protected areas, the benefits from which accrue globally and are enjoyed
especially by relatively wealthy westerners (Norton-Griffiths and Southey 1995).

The costs,

meanwhile, fall disproportionately on Kenya's poorest citizens, the rural poor on the periphery of
protected areas. These folk have grown increasingly dissatisfied with unnatural parks and reserves
(Western, Wright, and Stnlm 1994; Akama, Lant, and Burnett 1995).

Community-based
J

conservation schemes aim to benefit local populations, but these schemes have generally proved
unsatisfactory to date (Wells, Brandon, and Hannah 1991; Brandon and Wells 1992; Western,
Wright, and Strum 1994; Barrett and Arcese 1995, 1998). Social unrest over conservation in
low-income countries will become a far more serious threat to stewardship in the coming years if the
wealthy, there and here, do not exhibit more foresight and compassion.
In order to undertake these activities successfully, governments need a bedrock of

competitive markets and firm social norms. Well-functioning markets reduce the temptation of
policy makers to meddle in resource allocation issues over which they possess comparative
disadvantage, instead encouraging concentration on the fundamental functions of government
outlined above. The failures of governments, especially but not exclusively in the developing world,
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have thus been both of commission and omission (Krueger 1990). The good news is that it seems
we have learned this lesson and are adapting accordingly, if slowly.

III. Concluding Remarks

Authentic sustainable development, in the form of stewardship for creation and the humans
therein, rests on a tripartite foundation. An interrelated economic/ecological system ordered by the
axioms of efficiency, community, and compassion depends on competitive markets, social norms
that emphasize the ecological virtues, and responsible governments. Each supports the other using
complementary informational channels and incentive mechanisms to influence human behavior. We
cannot advance one without the others. Pluralistic stewardship is a complex, multidisciplinary task.
The past decade's sharp movement toward competitive markets needs reinforcement,
especially through the provision of complementary institutional and physical infrastructure to reduce
transactions costs, promote domestic and international competition, and level the playing field
between market participants. But we should not pin all our hopes on markets; their role is important
but necessarily limited. We must simultaneously cultivate an ethic of individual and collective
responsibility, for creation and its constituent species, not least of which for our fellow humans .
Nash ' s (1991) ecological virtues deserve promotion throughout civil society, not least of which in
churches and schools. As more people think globally and act locally, contemporary society can
obviate the potential problems of imperfect n1arkets and governments. Finally, governments need
to continue to extricate themselves from meddling in domestic and inten1ational trade, and focus
lTIOre on the essential tasks of providing public goods to improve information and understanding, to
facilitate market exchange by lowering transactions costs, to defend competitive markets, to ensure
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n1acroeconomic stability, and to provide social safety nets against exogenous shocks and transfers
across nations and generations. Participatory approaches to governance, based on the principle of
subsidiarity, are the keys to governance that advances the aims of efficiency, community, and
cOlnpasslon.
In summary, through markets, social norms, and governments, humanity can and must render

environmental stewardship compatible with survival for poor households, else we face catastrophic
loss of the human and nonhuman elements of creation in large tracts of the low-income tropics. The
past couple of decades have brought important advances in our understanding and operation of each
of those three basic institutions. While the challenges are great, there is reason for hope.

References

Akama, lS., C.L. Lant, and G.W. Burnett (1995). "Conflicting Attitudes Toward State Wildlife
Conservation Programs in Kenya." Society and Natural Resources 8:133-44.
Arrow, K., B. Bolin, R. Costanza, P. Dasgupta, C. Folke, C.S. Holling, B.-a. Jansson, S. Levin,
K.-G. Maler, C. Perrings, and D. Pilnentel (1995). "Economic Growth, Carrying Capacity,
and the Environment." Science 268:520-1.
Baland, J.-M., and J.-P. Platteau (1996). Halting Degradation of Natural Resources: Is There a
Role For Rural Communities? Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Barrett, C.B. (1996). "Stewardship and the Welfare Economics of Sustainable Development."
Bulletin of the Association of Christian Economists 27:13-26.
Barrett, C.B. (1997a). "Fairness, Stewardship and Sustainable Development."
Economics 19:11-7.

Ecological

Barrett, C.B. (1997b). "Idea Gaps, Object Gaps, and Trust Gaps in Economic Development."
Journal ofDeveloping Areas 31:553-68.
Barrett, C.B. (1998a). "Stochastic Food Prices and Slash-and-Burn Agriculture." Mimeo, Utah
State University.

/

27
Barrett, C.B. (1998b). "On Safety Nets and the Economics of Compassion." Mimeo, Utah State
University.
Barrett, C.B., and P. Arcese (1995). "Are Integrated Conservation-Development Projects (ICDPs)
Sustainable? On the Conservation of Large Mammals in Sub-Saharan Africa." World
Development 23: 1073-84.
Barrett, C.B., and P. Arcese (1998). "Wildlife Harvest In Integrated Conservation and Development
Projects:
Linking Harvest to Household Demand, Agricultural Production and
Enviromnental Shocks." Land Economics, in press.
Barrett, C.B., and M.R. Carter (forthcoming). "Micro economically Coherent Agricultural Policy
Reform in Africa." Chapter 13 in JoAnn Paulson (ed.), The Role ofthe State in Key Markets.
London: Macmillan.
Barrett, C.B., and J. Csete (1994). "Conceptualizing Hunger in Contemporary African
Policymaking: From Technical to Community-Based Approaches." Agriculture and Human
Values 11 :38-46.
Barrett, C.B., and R.E. Grizzle (forthcoming). "Pluralisn1, Science, Ethics, and the Intersecting
Spheres of Social Concerns and Environmentalism." Environmental Ethics.
/

Binswanger, H.P., and V.W. Ruttan (1978). Induced Innovation: Technology, Institutions and
Development. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Bishop, R.C. (1978). "Endangered Species and Uncertainty: The Economics of a Safe Minimum
Standard." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 60: 10-8.
Bluffstone, R.A. (1995). "The Effect of Labor Market Performance on Deforestation in Developing
Countries Under Open Access: An Example from Rural Nepal." Journal ofEnvironmentaI
Economics and Management 29:42-63.
Brandon, K.E., and M. Wells (1992). "Planning for People and Parks: Design Dilemmas." World
Development 20:557-70.
Bromley, D. W. (1989). Economic Interests and Institutions: The Conceptual Foundations ofPublic
Policy. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Bromley, D.W. (1991). Environment and Economy: Property Rights and Public Policy. Oxford:
Basil Blackwell.
Bromley, D.W. (ed.) (1992). Making the Commons Work. San Francisco, CA: ICS Press.

28
Coase, R.N. (1960). "The Problem of Social Cost." Journal

0/Law and Economics 3: 1-44.

Comnl0n, M., and C. Perrings (1992). "Towards an Ecological Economics of Sustainability."
Ecological Economics 6:7-34.
Coppock, D.L. (1994). The Borana Plateau o/Southern Ethiopia: Synthesis o/Pasto raI Research,
Development and Change, 1980-91. Addis Ababa: International Livestock Centre for
Africa.
Cordell, J., and M.A. McKean (1992). "Sea Tenure in Bahia, Brazil." In D.W. Bromley (ed.),
Making The Commons Work, San Francisco, CA: ICS Press.
Cun1ming, D. (1996). (p. 5)
Daly, H.E., and J. Cobb (1989). For The Common Good. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
Dasgupta, P. (1993). An Inquiry Into Well-Being and Destitution. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Evensky, J. (1993). "Ethics and the Invisible Hand." Journal o/Economic Perspectives 7: 197-205.
Gandhi, V.P. (ed.) (1996). Macroeconomics and the Environment. Washington, DC: International
Monetary Fund.
Georgescu-Roegen, _ (1971). The Entropy Law and the Economic Process. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
Grizzle, R.E., and C.B. Barrett (1998). "The One Body of Christian EnvirOlUTIentalislTI." Zygon:
The Journal 0/ Religion and Science, in press.
Hanna, S. (1996). "Designing Institutions for the Environment." Environment and Development
Economics 1: 122-5.
Hill, P.J. (1994). "Can Markets or Governments Do More for the Environment?" In M. Cromartie
(ed.), Creation AtRisk? Religion, Science, andEnvironmentalism. GrandRapids,MI: W.B.
Eerdmans Publishing.
Holling, C.S. (ed.) (1978). AdaptiveEnvironmentalAssessmentandManagement. Chichester, NY:
JOml D. Wiley.
Holling, C.S. (1992). "Cross-Scale Morphology, Geometry, and Dynamics of Ecosystems."
Ecological Monographs 62:447-502.

/

29
Holling, C.S. (1994). "An Ecologist View of the Malthusian Conflict." InK. Lindahl-Kiessling and
H. Landberg (eds.), Population, Economic Development, and the Environment, Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Krueger, A. O. (1990). "Government Failures in Development." Journal ofEconomic Perspectives
4:9-23.
Majer, K.-G., and M. Munasinghe (1996). "Macroeconomic Policies, Second-Best Theory and the
Environment." Environment and Development Economics 1: 149-63.
Nash, J.A. (1991). Loving Nature. Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press.
North. D.C. (1991). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge,
MA: Cambridge University Press.
Norton, B.G. (1992). "A New Paradigm for Environmental Management." In R. Costanza, B.G.
Norton, and B.D. Haskell (eds.), Ecosystem Health: New Goals for Environmental
Management, Covelo, CA: Island Press.
Norton, B.G. (1995). "Why I AIn Not a Nonanthropocentrist: Callicott and the Failure of Monistic
Inherentism." Environmental Ethics 17:341-58.
NOlion, B.G., and M.A. Toman (1997). "Sustainability: Ecological and Economic Perspectives."
Land Economics 73 :553-68.
Norton-Griffiths, M., and C. Southey (1995). "The Opportunity Costs of Biodiversity Conservation
in Kenya." Ecological Economics 12:125-39.
Opschoor, J.B., and S.M. Jongma (1996). "Bretton Woods Intervention Programmes and
Sustainable Development." Environment and Development Economics 1: 183-202.
Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the Commons: The Evolution ofInstitutions for Collective Action.
Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
Perrings, C. (1989). "An Optimal Path To Extinction? Poverty and Resource Degradation in the
Open Agrarian Economy." Journal ofDevelopment Economics 30:1-24.
Perrings, C. (1996). Sustainable Development and Poverty Alleviation in Sub-Saharan Africa: The
Case of Botswana. New York: St. Martin's Press.
Platteau, l-P. (1994a). "Behind the Market Stage Where Real Societies Exist-Part I: The Role
of Public and Private Order Institutions." Journal ofDevelopment Studies 30:533-77.

30
Platteau, J.-P. (1994b). "Behind the Market Stage Where Real Societies Exist-Part II: The Role
of Moral Norms." Journal ofDevelopment Studies 30:753-817.
Polanyi, K. (1957). The Great Transformation. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
Putnam, R.D. (1993). Making Democracy Work. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Reardon, T., and S.A. Vosti (1995). "Links Between Rural Poverty and the Environment in
Developing Countries: Asset Categories and Investment Poverty." World Development 23:
1495-506.
Sagoff, M. (1995). "Carrying Capacity and Ecological Economics." BioScience 45:610-20.
Sen, A. (1987). On Ethics and Economics. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Sen, A. (1993). "Markets and Freedoms: Achievements and Lilnitations of the Market Mechanism
in Promoting Individual Freedoms." Oxford Economic Papers 45:519-41.
Sethi, R., and E. SOlnanathan (1996). "The Evolution of Social NornlS in Common Pool Resource
Use." American Economic Review 86:766-88.
Smith, A. (p. 17)

/

Tiffen, M., M. Mortimore, and F. Gichuki (1994). More People, Less Erosion: Environmental
Recovery in Kenya. Chichester, NY: John D. Wiley.
Wells, M., K. Brandon, and L. Hannah (1992). People and Parks: Linking Protected Area
Management with Local Communities. Washington, DC: World Bank, World Wildlife
Fund, and U.S. Agency for International Development.
Western, D., R.M. Wright, and S.C. Strum (1994). Natural Connections:
Community-Based Conservation. Washington, DC: Island Press.

Perspectives in

World Bank (1992). World Development Report 1992. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
World Commission on Environment and Development (1987). Our Common Future. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.

Economic Research Institute Study Paper
ERI#98-05

MARKETS, SOCIAL NORMS, AND GOVERNMENTS IN
THE SERVICE OF ENVIRONMENTALLY SUSTAINABLE
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

by
CHRISTOPHER B. BARRETT

Department of Economics
Utah State University
3530 Old Main Hill
Logan, UT 84322-3530

April 1998

MARKETS, SOCIAL NORMS, AND GOVERNMENTS IN
THE SERVICE OF ENVIRONMENTALLY SUSTAINABLE
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Christopher B. Barrett, Assistant Professor
Department of Economics
Utah State University
3530 Old Main Hill
Logan, UT 84322-3530

/

The analyses and views reported in this paper are those of the author(s). They are not necessarily
endorsed by the Department of Economics or by Utah State University.
Utah State University is committed to the policy that all persons shall have equal access to its
programs and employment without regard to race, color, creed, religion, national origin, sex, age,
marital status, disability, public assistance status, veteran status, or sexual orientation.
Information on other titles in this series may be obtained from: Department of Economics, Utah
State University, 3530 Old Main Hill, Logan, Utah 84322-3530.
Copyright © 1998 by Christopher B. Barrett. All rights reserved. Readers may make
verbatim copies of this document for noncommercial purposes by any means, provided that this
copyright notice appears on all such copies.

MARKETS, SOCIAL NORMS, AND GOVERNMENTS IN
THE SERVICE OF ENVIRONMENTALLY SUSTAINABLE
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Christopher B. Barrett

ABSTRACT

/

MARKETS, SOCIAL NORMS, AND GOVERNMENTS IN
THE SERVICE OF ENVIRONMENTALLY SUSTAINABLE
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT!

The concepts "stewardship" and "sustainable development" arise frequently in contemporary
work on environmental protection and economic development. The considerable variation in the use
of the concepts, however, largely reflects the commentators' different and often hidden normative
axioms. This paper highlights several distinct, influential normative traditions and explains how
together these point toward multiple institutional channels to meet contemporary environmental
challenges. My own perspective is that of a development economist with research interests in
agricultural development and poverty alleviation in poor communities. So in this paper I concentrate
on low- and middle-income countries-which account for 85% of the world's population and 76%
J

of its inhabited land mass-and hence on the "green" issues of renewable resource management that
disproportionately affect poor rural popUlations in the low-income world more so than on "brown"
issues of pollution and waste disposal more pressing to urban folk and the industrial world.

I. Distinct Normative Approaches

Economics, ecology, and ecumenism all derive from the Greek word aikas, meanIng
household, but by no means share the same assumptions of what is essential or desirable. Our
disciplinary traditions often cloud our ability to understand why others might reasonably take a

IAn earlier version of this paper was prepared for the conference "Global Stewardship: From the Academy
To the Public Square," in Gloucester, MA, October 1996, sponsored by the Coalition for Christian Colleges and
Universities and the Pew Charitable Trusts, and hosted by Gordon College. I thank participants at that gathering, Clara
Barrett, Ray Grizzle, and Dwight Israelsen, for stimulating conversations and comments that influenced this paper. This
work was generously supported by the Pew Global Stewardship Initiative, a Pew Evangelical Scholars Fellowship, and
the Utah Agricultural Experiment Station. Approved as UAES journal paper No. 5006.
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different approach. This section briefly maps out some useful core principles of and fundamental
differences between economic, ecological, and ecumenical Christian perspectives on sustainable
development and stewardship. My goal here is to distill the core normative principles of these
perspectives not to provide a comprehensive survey.

A. Economics
Economists occupy privileged positions in contemporary policy debates, including those
concerning the environment. This is particularly evident in debates surrounding "sustainable
development," suddenly a central theme of the foreign policy of wealthy, industrial nations, of
development lending by multilateral organizations, and of the conservation strategies ofintemational
environmental groups. Perhaps the most commonly cited defmition of "sustainable development"
is that of the Brundtland Commission: "development that meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (WCED 1987, p. 43). This
definition summarizes a generation of economic thinking about environmental protection as
fundamentally a question of optimal intertemporal management of natural resources.
But the element of the Brundtland Commission definition on which most scholars and
policymakers has seized is its explicit adoption of intergenerational equity as the core normative
axiom of sustainable development. It is easy to see why this mandates environmental protection.
Nondeclining future per capita incomes and standards of living depend on a nondeclining stock of
productive capital. Since some capital stock depreciates naturally, sustainable development requires
substitution for consumed, nonrenewable natural resources, and investment in those substitutes at
no less than the rate of simultaneous depletion of environmental resources (Georgescu-Roegen 1971;
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Daly and Cobb 1989; Perrings 1996). As awareness of the complex fabric of ecosystems has
increased, however, economists' confidence in the substitutability between forms of capital has
diminished. While some substitution possibilities are feasible (e.g., solar energy from photovoltaic
cells in place of energy produced by burning fossil fuels), we have become increasingly cautious
about environmental destruction and manufactured replacement as a sustainable pattern of resource
use. So economists have become increasingly cognizant that conservation of natural capital is
central to intergenerational equity and to the optimal management of a resource.
But why emphasize intergenerational equity over intra generational equity? If the goal is to
make possible for others what is possible for us-a variant of the golden rule-the principle applies
no less within contemporary society than across sequenced societies, a point regrettably ignored in
most contemporary writing on sustainable development. This oversight matters, since the poor are
both victims and agents of environmental degradation (Barrett 1996). Basing the sustainable
development ethic on intergenerational equity seems an arbitrary and incomplete social philosophy.
The more useful economic principle embodied in the Brundtland Commission definition is
that of P areti an efficiency: we must not waste resources in the process of meeting the needs of the
present generation. A distribution is "Pareto efficient" if and only if no one could be better off
without making at least one person worse off. It is rare, however, to find changes that would not
make at least one person worse off, so the Pareto criterion in its strict sense is relatively useless.
More useful is the concept of "potential" Pareto improvements, combined with the compensation
principle, wherein gainers fully compensate the losers from a particular policy reform. 2 Pareto

2Without compensation, the potential Pareto principle reduces to utilitarianism.
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efficiency and competitive market equilibria are logically equivalent under particular, common
assumptions. 3 This equivalency between competitive market equilibria and efficiency motivates
economists' heavy reliance on markets as mechanisms for allocating scarce resources of all kinds.
Market prices playa central role in efficient allocation across space and time. But problems
arise under three common circumstances: in the presence of externalities that drive a wedge between
private and social valuation, in the absence of markets and observable prices, and in the face of
uncertainty against which one cannot fully insure (e.g., the environmental impacts of irreversible
development) .
Externalities, the absence of markets and observable pnces, uncertainty, imperfect
substitutability, and the dynamic interdependence of systems weaken the textbook case for free
markets but do not fundamentally alter the central importance of efficiency, as quite distinct from
the market mechanism used to foster efficiency. These merely complicate the computation of costs
and benefits necessary to establish the availability of potential Pareto improvements and create the
space for nonmarket institutions-social norms and governments, in particular-to play an important
role in efficient resource allocation. The key normative criterion contributed by economics is not
the intergenerational equity but the more fundamental principle of efficiency.

B. Ecology
The anthropocentric line of economic reasoning described above understandably disturbs
many ecologists, conservation biologists, and ethicists who find intrinsic value in nature itself, not

3This relationship's high status within the discipline is clearly reflected by its label: the First and Second
Theorems of Welfare Economics.
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just instrumental value derived from nature's capacity to satisfy human needs and wants. Objecting
to environmental management based solely on human valuation of natural resources, commentators
routinely emphasize that humans are merely a part of a complex ecosystem that influences us as
much as we influence it. As a species, we have been relatively slow to recognize the importance of
community between humankind and otherkind and to therefore take greater care in our treatment of
the rest of Creation. Perhaps Sagoff(1995, p. 618) sums this sentiment up best: "[t]he reasons to
protect nature are moral, religious, and cultural far more often than they are economic." I would
largely agree with this claim, while pointing out that while the reasons to protect nature may be
largely noneconomic, in a fallen world the means to do so rely (perhaps distressingly) more on
economICS.
Irrespective of the rights of other kind, humans design and implement efforts to steward the
biosphere. Allowing for even the slightest human free agency and sinfulness, getting human
incentives right is a necessary condition to environmentally sustainable behaviors, regardless of the
morally appropriate allocation of rights. If we are to recognize the coevolutionary nature of all
Creation-humankind and otherkind-in all of the small, daily choices that collectively leave a
considerable human footprint on the biosphere, incentives have got to guide human behaviors in
appropriate directions.

Markets, influenced by governments and by the social norms of

communities, establish those incentives.
The anthropocentric arrogance rightly challenged by many conservationists is too often
mirrored by "green imperialism" on the part of conservation groups. The gazetting of parks in the
low-income world and various other initiatives born of western environmental campaigns too often
amount to little more than a wealthy population's imposition of its values on a distant poor
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population that bears most of the costs of conservation. As David Cumming of the Worldwide Fund
for Nature recognizes, "Only in Britain and America do people mistake animal welfare for
conservation. To force western values on African culture is cultural imperialism" (as quoted in The

Economist, Sept. 7, 1996, p. 15). The principle of humility is central to the concept of community.
Humility must be reflected in method as well.

Mainstream economists tend to build

universal models based on micro-scale theories of the consumer and of the firm. Systems ecologists,
on the other hand, are more inclined to deemphasize individual members of species and to express
concern about large-scale systems (Norton and Toman 1997). A more promising and recent
perspective emerges from hierarchical systems, which nest smaller scale systems within larger scale
ones (Common and Perrings 1992; Holling 1992, 1994; Norton 1992), debunking the notion that the
macrocosm mirrors the microcosm. An understanding of small-scale dynamics does not imply an
understanding of large-scale ones, nor vice versa.
The crucial normative axiom emerging from the ecological sciences is that of community,
and, derivatively, humility regarding our place in the biosphere. The very dependence of humanity
on the rest of creation and the intrinsic worth of nature should imbue us with appropriate caution.

An axiom of community does not, however, absolve us of the need to make conservation consistent
with humans' imperfect aspirations nor of the need to satisfy aspirations in the most efficient manner
possible.
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C. Christian4
There is no single "Christian" environmentalism today, but rather a rich diversity of
approaches. These are perhaps best recognized as the embodiment ofSt. Paul's (l Corinthians 12)
insight that we are many parts of one body (Grizzle and Barrett 1998). The economic and ecology
paradigms crudely mapped above offer distinct, fundamental truths, but neither can stand fully on
its own.

Christian environmentalism is gradually evolving toward a more holistic approach

incorporating the ethics of efficiency and community and adding to these a cornerstone principle of
Christianity: compassion. Christ directs His followers to feel the pain of those who suffer and to
attend to their needs. Simply put, Christians must heal the suffering of creation, both its human and
nonhuman components. Compassion is a call to seek justice.
The axiom of compassion adds value those of community and efficiency. Recognition of
interdependence within a community, even of moral equality, stops short of motivating action to
. remedy identifiable problems. Meanwhile, efficiency generally concentrates on the procedural
justice of competitive markets, ignoring issues of ex ante distributional justice (are initial
distributions fair?) and, as a consequence, of ex post distributional justice. 5 The axiom of
compassion fills these notable voids and, together with community and efficiency, creates a set of
useful axioms with which we can define and pursue environmentally sustainable economic
development.

4While I suspect the principles discussed in this section apply to many non-Christian faiths , I am only able to
speak competently to my own religion' s perspective on the biosphere.
5Barrett (1996, 1997a) advocates "fairness" theory as a way to include both distributional and procedural justice
considerations in economic theorizing about sustainable development.

/

8

The Christian tradition is also explicitly pluralistic, admitting multiple principles to guide
behavior. Jesus explicitly rejected moral monism when challenged to single out the greatest of all
commandments, replying instead that there are two fundamental principles (Mark 12:28-31). There
is considerable and growing support for a similarly pluralistic approach to contemporary
environmental issues (Norton 1995; Norton and Toman 1997; Barrett and Grizzle forthcoming;
Grizzle and Barrett 1998).
Pluralism poses two major challenges. First, all parties must maintain a commitment to open,
respectful dialogue. Pluralism thus favors participatory methods to identify and analyze challenges,
and to propose, design, implement, and evaluate prospective solutions. Decision making necessarily
becomes more local, with policy making done "from the bottom up," following the principle of
subsidiarity.

Environmental policy is becoming more participatory and more local, perhaps

especially in low-income agrarian communities in which global environmental challenges of
biodiversity loss and deforestation are paramount (Wells, Brandon, and Hannah 1992; Western,
Wright, and Strum 1994). The dictum "think globally, act locally" encourages community-based
activism, and the evidence in both the social and biological sciences is that pluralistic approaches
are more effective than monistic ones in combating serious problems (Barrett and Csete 1994;
Western, Wright, and Strum 1994).
The second major challenge is the need for multiple accounting systems and decision rules
corresponding to the multiple axioms underpinning choice (Norton and Toman 1997). This
necessarily requires parallel efforts at understanding the same phenomena or alternatives from
different perspectives. A pluralistic system will not likely be a least-cost means to make decisions
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about the environment, 6 but it is perhaps best suited to an adaptive management paradigm (Holling
1978), explicitly recognizing both the depth of our ignorance about inherently uncertain ecological
relationships and the considerable value of information that can help reduce that uncertainty.

D. Pluralistic Stewardship 7
The concept of "pluralistic stewardship" offers a helpful means to reconcile the potentially
complementary axioms of efficiency, community, and compassion. Stewardship holds that the
possessor of a natural resource should behave as a custodian, using the resource wisely but enjoined
from destruction or disposal. Stewardship of creation, i.e., of the full array of human and nonhuman
biota and abiota, combines efficiency and compassion, in its mandate of wise resource use on behalf
of all creation, with community in its denial of individual ownership of all possible rights in
J

property, most notably the right of destruction. Stewardship identifies possessors as managers,
servants, and beneficiaries rather than as masters.
Stewardship necessarily limits property rights, denying the Lockean tradition of ownership
that lies at the core of western market economies, wherein a full suite of property rights (i.e.,
including rights to destruction and disposal) derives from the application of human labor effort to
a hitherto unclaimed resource. Stewardship resembles more closely many communal tenure regimes,
wherein exclusive rights to use and even to transfer a resource (particularly by bequest) accrue to the
person who first domesticates it. Property rights are social constructions; ownership must be

6Note that "least cost" and "most efficient" are often mistakenly treated as synonymous in the popular press.
The most efficient solution maximizes net benefits (total benefits less total costs), i.e., it exhibits zero net marginal cost,
which is different than zero total cost.
7This term originates with Barrett and Grizzle (forthcoming).
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recognized and enforced within a society, whether by a state with police powers or by elders with
moral authority. There is nothing fundamental to rights systems that necessitates ubiquitous private
ownership of natural resources. This in no way denies the strong efficiency arguments favoring
private property rights associated with possession (see section IIA on markets). Pluralistic
stewardship merely limits the extent of those rights in order to recognize that compassion and
community are normative axioms not dominated by the axiom of efficiency.

II. Information Channels and Incentive Mechanisms
Articulating normative axioms is necessary but insufficient to advancing the goal of
environmentally sustainab Ie economic development. Implementation must be carried out by humans
needing reliable and timely information available on which to base decisions, and facing incentives
.J

that must induce them to behave in a manner consistent with socially agreed normative axioms.
Human decision making is framed by three broad classes of institutions that guide
information flow and incentives: markets, social norms, and governments. Each employs a different
enforcement mechanism to influence individual choice. Social norms invoke conscience and peer
pressure, governments rely on police and taxation powers, and markets employ individual's
self-interest. These are thus best viewed as complementary institutions that society can shape so as
to facilitate economic development and environmental protection (Barrett 1997 a, 1997b; Barrett and
Grizzle forthcoming). As Arrow et al. (1995, p. 520) put it, "The solution to environmental
degradation lies in such institutional reforms as would compel private users of environmental
resources to take account of the social costs of their actions." This section discusses each of these
three broad institutions and why all three are necessary to advance pluralistic stewardship.

11
A. Markets
Markets are inherently pluralistic institutions. Indeed, markets are interesting and important
precisely because they encourage interaction and coordination within a society comprised of
individuals possessing different information, abilities, and preferences. Minority viewpoints have
as much standing in a market as majority viewpoints. By offering mutually beneficial exchange,
markets provide a means to articulate and accommodate plural interests. Individuals are part of a
complex system of production, consumption, and exchange, a material ecosystem of sorts. When
competitive, markets are one of the best known means to limit the concentration and abuse of
individual power.
Perhaps markets' most important function is to provide information essential to the efficient
allocation of resources to' their most valuable uses through price signals of relative scarcity. The
prices heterogeneous people and firms are willing to accept or pay offer a useful summary statistic
for relative value in markets in which information flows freely. Complete competitive markets
generate price signals that yield Pareto efficient equilibria. Moreover, price signals induce much
nonrandom resource substitution, technological advance, and scientific discovery to improve
resource management (Binswanger and Ruttan 1978). When markets function properly, increasing
resource scarcity naturally increases the returns to inventions that conserve, substitute for or discover
new stocks of threatened natural capital.
Increased relative scarcity occurs either because of increased demand or decreased supply.
As incomes and public awareness of limited ecological resilience increase, more people place greater
intrinsic value on environmental protection and demand for natural resources increases, driving up
their prices and encouraging their conservation. Similarly, increased perception ofresource scarcity,
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caused by depletion or by scientific findings that increase estimated minimum sustainable stocks
(ecological resilience), raises resource prices and encourages voluntary conservation. Both demand
and supply-side impulses encourage creative conservation innovations and the transfer of resource
use rights to those who best conserve the resource. This is apparent in the rapid and widespread
emergence of wildlife ranches in eastern and southern Africa, and in the increasingly common
purchase of land by environmental nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that subsequently
convert the area into reserves. Competitive markets facilitate conservation.
Controlled markets, by contrast, distort prices, often discouraging conservation and
promoting unsustainable rates of resource exploitation. This is the experience of most centrally
planned economies. Industries in China and eastern Europe generated unprecedented air pollution
because they were directed to produce a certain volume of manufactures, without competition from
foreign imports, and using coal-generated energy priced below cost. Administrative pricing and
regulated production and trade patterns distort the information and incentives available to microlevel decision makers. When combined with ancillary interventions to ensure the most vulnerable
and resource-dependent members of society can share in the benefits, market-oriented economic
liberalization can thus be socially and environmentally beneficial (Barrett and Carter forthcoming).
Competitive markets are not free nor do they emerge spontaneously; they are expensive
social constructions wherein individuals come together freely to transfer rights over the future value
of an object or service (Polanyi 1957; Bromley 1991). Competitive markets thus require low
transactions costs that permit a well-defined and defended system of transferable property rights, and
mature financial systems to facilitate exchange. Hence the intrinsic interdependency between
markets, social norms, and government.
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Property rights make individuals accountable for their actions and thereby create incentives
for resource conservation or transfer. It is because the principle of accountability underlies an
effective system of property rights that state ownership generally fails, especially with a powerful
state not beholden to its constituents. Property rights are most effective when parties' rights can be
enforced and exchanged.

Any of several kinds of tenurial regimes-e.g., private property,

co-management, etc.--can offer clearly defined, protected, and transferable private usufructure rights
that foster efficient and equitable resource management (Baland and Platteau 1996; Hanna 1996).
The importance of transactions costs has long been recognized in economics (Coase 1960)
and is the central theme of the new institutional economics (Bromley 1989, 1991; North 1991;
Platteau 1994a, 1994b). Hill (1994, p. 124) points to transaction costs as "the reason for the
divergence between private actions and social consequences. . .. If we think of transaction costs
as the costs ofdefining and enforcing rights and carrying out exchanges, it obvious that these costs
are much higher with some resources, such as air, than with others, such as land. We fail to have
fully defined rights over certain resources because of high transaction costs, and in those cases the
unfettered interaction of individuals will not produce the socially desirable amount of activity"
(emphasis in original). Higher transaction costs lead to less complete sets of property rights and less
efficient exchange of existing rights, with the consequence that more natural resources fall prey to
overexploitation. Transactions costs are particularly high in the low-income agrarian nations of the
-tropics, leading to poorly defined and enforced systems of property rights, limited exchange
opportunities, incomplete and noncompetitive markets, and a dangerously rapid rate of deforestation,
desertification, biodiversity depletion, topsoil erosion, and air and water pollution.
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Transactions costs are high in the absence of well-functioning communications and transport
networks-the physical infrastructure of an economy--or of a mature legal system and a free
press-the institutional infrastructure of an economy-to produce clear and consistent definition,
enforcement, and transferability of property rights. Moreover, all well-functioning market systems
have depended on pervasive generalized morality (Bromley 1989; North 1991; Evensky 1993;
Platteau 1994a, 1994b; Barrett 1997b). Interpersonal trust and social networks founded on trust
permit low-cost transactions, efficient division of labor according to comparative advantage, and
higher rates of investment and innovation.
Financial markets are of special importance because they permit borrowing and saving to
finance the purchase of durable property rights, and they enable individuals to insure against risks
that might otherwise impede investment and resource conservation. The absence of well-functioning
financial markets for saving, credit, and insurance often fosters excessive resource exploitation. For
example, pastoralists who cannot reliably save in or borrow from a banking system have a tendency
to overstock pasture, leading to increasingly fragile range ecology and greater risk of livestock dieoffs (Coppock 1994). Similarly, insufficient access to credit or insurance to allow peasant farmers
to mitigate price risk in staple foodstuffs increases incentives to undertake destructive slash-and-burn
farming (Barrett 1998a). By contrast, debt-for-nature swaps executed by international environmental
NGOs have helped protect millions of hectares of ecologically valuable forest and rangeland in the
low-income tropics over the past decade only because secondary markets in sovereign debt emerged
in a competitive international financial market.
For all their virtues ofpromoting efficiency and community, markets are not especially wellsuited to advancing the goal of compassion. This threatens the environment because the poor are
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both the principle victims and the primary destroyers of natural capital in the low-income tropics
(Perrings 1989, 1996; World Bank 1992; Reardon and Vosti 1995; Barrett 1996, 1997a, 1998a;
Barrett and Arcese 1995, 1998). Deforestation, wildlife poaching that threatens biodiversity loss,
overgrazing that facilitates erosion and habitat destruction, and other unsustainable exploitations of
renewable resources too often result from one billion poor peoples' daily struggle to survive.
Attempts at resource conservation today may be futile in the absence of measures to combat poverty
since "for the environment, destitution is far worse than economic development" (Sagoff 1995,
p. 616). More optimistically, the World Bank (1992, p. 1) asserts, "there are strong 'win-win'
opportunities that remain unexploited. The most important of these relates to poverty reduction; not
only is attacking poverty amoral imperative, but it is also essential for environmental stewardship."
The good news is that futile experimentation with state-directed resource allocation is now a thing
of the past, and there are widespread good faith efforts at building authentically competitive markets
based on well-defined systems of property rights and low transaction costs. The movement toward
markets in the low-income world is desirable, well under way, and likely irreversible.

B. Social Norms
Social norms are the standards of conduct and moral judgements collectively espoused by
individuals within a society. The cultivation and maintenance of norms that celebrate the axioms
of efficiency, community, and compassion are thus obvious means by which contemporary society
can operationalize stewardship. Norms are necessary to pluralistic stewardship because a wildly
uneven distribution of decision-making power endows a small subpopulation of humans with
virtually unchecked discretion over creation. Markets and governments can limit the damage done

/

16
directly or indirectly by this cohort (of which we are certainly a part), but those formal institutions
are rarely sufficient to prevent catastrophic, irreversible environmental damage.

Moreover,

governments and markets are weakest in precisely those parts of the low-income world where
renewable resource depletion is of greatest concern.
Thankfully, many individuals and cultures already adhere to a strong ecological ethic,
although, regrettably, economic and governmental forces sometimes erode these traditions.
Individual conscience and social stigma can serve to enforce norms of efficiency, humility, and
compassion where economic and legal institutions cannot. The more social scientists study social
behavior applied to common property resources, the more we realize the importance of what Cordell
and McKean (1992, p. 191) observe in Brazil to be an ethical code "far more binding on individual
conscience than any government regulations ever could be."g

Thus, a "central objective of

environmental protection movements must be to define and promote a holistic ecological ethic so
as to enlarge the population which values environmental protection and the satisfaction of basic
human needs sufficiently to generate an environmentally and socially sustainable society" (Barrett
and Grizzle forthcoming).
Social norms have direct and obvious value to stewardship because they encourage
individuals to exercise compassion and humility. Economic theory tells us that some "public" goods
will be severely undersupplied by markets because the provider of public goods cannot exclude
others from enjoying their benefits. Marginal private benefits are thus less than marginal social

80strom (1990) and Bromley (1992) offer excellent summaries of this rapidly emerging literature. Dasgupta
(1993) offers an excellent discussion of the importance and power of internalized norms, and Putnam (1993) offers
fascinating insights on the value of persistent civic-mindedness in democratic society.
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benefits of public goods investment, leading to socially suboptimal supply. There are many
examples, however, of public goods that are plentifully supplied by private donor-investors: e.g.,
community leadership or houses of religious worship. Individuals often pay for such amenities out
of a sense of duty as much as because they are maximizing their own welfare (Barrett 1998b).
Just as the empirical evidence does not fully support the neoclassical prediction that public
goods should always and everywhere be severely undersupplied, so too does the evidence fail to
support the popular prediction that common property resources will always be overexploited.
Overexploitation of open access resources occurs much less so than "the tragedy of the commons"
predicts. A better understanding of why individuals voluntarily exercise restraint is of potentially
enormous importance to the task of pluralistic stewardship. Evolutionary game theorists are finding
that social systems exhibit multiple stable equilibria, including not only those characterized by the
tragedy of the commons, in which individualistic behavior leads to resource overexploitation, but
also a norm-guided society of cooperation, individual restraint, and decentralized enforcement of
codes of conduct (Platteau 1994a, 1994b; Baland and Platteau 1996; Sethi and Somanathan 1996).
The key to realizing the latter, preferable equilibrium is that a sufficient proportion of society acts
cooperatively so that this behavior persists in the face of idiosyncratic violation by a minority.
Hence, the importance of promoting ecological ethics of the sort captured in the popular
maxim "think globally, act locally." In the face of increased individual mobility that decreases
communities' capacity to induce cooperative individual behavior by sanctioning transgressors, it
becomes all the more important to instill in people a strong self-directed ethic of stewardship.
Toward that end, Nash (1991) advances a set of nine "ecological virtues," which he describes as
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"patterns of personal and social perspective and behavior that, if followed, can make ecological
integrity a reality."
The good news is that such virtues are being actively promoted in churches, schools, and
local gathering places throughout the world. There has been a stunning shift in perspective regarding
humanity's place in and responsibilities to creation in the past generation. Anyone who spends time
in elementary or secondary schools, in this country and many others, cannot help but come away
impressed by the depth and sincerity of the environmental stewardship convictions held and
expressed by today's children. While some of this innocent idealism will surely tarnish as they age,
I retain great hope that we are helping our children learn early the lessons we and our parents
discovered rather late: that we need to think globally and act locally.
Social norms also have instrumental value through their facilitation of competitive markets
and good governance. As discussed already, efficient markets depend on a generalized morality.
Although rarely recognized by those who most frequently invoke his writings, Adam Smith
advocated a market economy not because he believed in its inherent virtue, but because he believed
most people were sufficiently virtuous to make market exchange feasible and that the police power
of the state could satisfactorily contain the damage done by the rest. Indeed, in his Theory o/Moral

Sentiments, Smith emphasized the superiority of assistance "reciprocally afforded from love, from
gratitude, from friendship, and esteem" as the root of a flourishing society. Recognizing, however,
that "man has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren, and it is vain for him to expect
it from their benevolence only," Smith saw an important role for self-interested behavior as well,
hence his famous "invisible hand" metaphor. In Smith's view, a market-based "society, though less
happy and agreeable, ... may subsist . .. by a mercenary exchange of good offices accordingly to
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an agreed valuation." The virtue of markets, in the authentic Smithian view, is that they are
participatory, encouraging free and frequent human interaction that induces innovation and requires
honest behavior to maintain associates' trust. Simply put, Smith saw a market economy founded
on social norms as more compatible with the other necessary ingredients of a moral society than the
feudal or mercantilist systems familiar to eighteenth century England.
The norms prevailing in a society also underpin its governance. Widely held perceptions of
what is fair behavior limit potential abuses of power. Procedural legitimacy is necessary for the
sustainability of any human institution. Violence, towards the poor or the environment, feeds on
silence; it is overcome through advocacy and dialogue.
Social norms in tum depend on markets and governments. While love is the greatest virtue,
it may also be the scarcest, and we must therefore economize on its use where we can. This is the
point of the earlier quote by Adam Smith in his famous argument for free markets, which lessen
individuals' dependence on others' benevolence. Moreover, competitive markets and participatory
governance facilitate regular human contact that helps feed compassion and a commitment to
pluralism.
Governments, meanwhile, help ensure satisfactory provision of public goods in information,
law enforcement, and education, which help shape and buttress the norms prevailing in a society.
The legal and regulatory systems of the state also articulate and enforce codes of conduct, thereby
setting uniform public standards on matters of broad agreement. Among the most important
safeguards a government can defend are the rights to free speech and religious tolerance, for the
defense of minority views and interests is crucial to the persistence of authentically pluralistic
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systems. This checks the tendency of social norms to mutate into ideologies that can become
oppressive rather than liberating.
Governments also have an important role in cushioning against shocks, both domestically
and internationally. The severe dislocations involved in rapid sociopolitical transitions in Europe,
Africa, and Latin America, and the apparent rapid rise in crime and predatory behavior are disturbing
examples of what can happen when governments become impotent in a time of swift change. Where
national governments have been unable to cushion their citizens from dramatic change, the
international community has a practical need as well as a moral obligation to assist. As economies
integrate internationally and communities become less isolated from external cultures, harmonization
of international codes of conduct becomes crucial to maintaining stable, cooperative social systems.
The easier it becomes to escape social sanction, the less likely is a system to evolve toward a
norm-guided equilibrium in which individuals transcend purely self-interested welfare maximization
to behave in a socially optimal fashion. Isolationist policies are a clear threat to the establishment
and maintenance of universal norms that must underpin environmentally sustainable development.
Many of the most pressing contemporary environmental challenges-biodiversity loss,
deforestation, desertification, soil erosion-are most acute where markets and governments are
weakest. Individuals must nonetheless have an impulse to steward resources without the lure of
profit or the threat of government penalty. Hence, the urgent need to cultivate universal norms of
pluralistic stewardship within ourselves, our churches, our ~ivic institutions, and our children.

C. Governments
The traditional economic view is that the appropriate role of government is to correct market
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failures and to provide public goods. Unfortunately, many states have failed to do those two things
well with serious consequences, and, as a consequence, governments are under attack in most places.
Nonetheless, governments have crucial roles to play in the task of pluralistic stewardship. While
improving the quality of governance is a desirable objective, we need to take care not to destroy the
credibility and authority of governments in the process of reforming them.
Markets founded on self-interested, optimizing behavior will generally not lead to an efficient
allocation of resources in the presence of externalities. Governments can eliminate externalities
through taxes or subsidies to equate private and social costs and benefits. Theory tells us taxes and
subsidies will usually be more efficient than regulatory prohibitions.

But where uncertainty

abounds, then there may be a sound basis for regulation according to the precautionary principle
(Bishop 1978). This principle is the basis for safe minimum standards to minimize downside risk
associated with potentially catastrophic events.
Public goods are a very special type of externality associated with goods that are "nonrival"
(many individuals can enjoy it without diminishing another's consumption) and "nonexcludable."
Governments need to provide public goods that fulfill five important objectives: (i) to facilitate low
transactions costs that enable the definition, enforcement, and exchange of property rights; (ii) to
improve information on and understanding of the relationship between human society and the
broader ecosystems of which we are a part; (iii) to defend competitive markets; (iv) to ensure
macroeconomic stability; and (v) to cushion society against shocks, providing social safety nets and
transfers as needed.

Having already discussed the provision of physical and institutional

infrastructure to reduce transactions costs, let us now tum to these other four missions.
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Reliable and timely information properly understood is fundamental to making efficient and
compassionate choices. Research and education are the principal means by which societies produce
information and understanding. The empirical evidence strongly suggests that basic research and
training is distinctly undersupplied by private sources, yielding extraordinarily high annual rates of
return to public research and training. The more we study ecosystems and their linkages to
socioeconomic systems, the more we learn about how resilient or fragile each system is to distinct
types of perturbations and the better equipped we become to steward creation. Recent initiatives to
fully integrate environmental sustainability questions into more traditional lines of research in
engineering and the social sciences deserve considerable attention and support. Governments must
be reminded regularly of the wisdom of investing in the public goods of research and education.
Governments must also defend the competitiveness of markets through active antitrust
enforcement, now largely absent in the low- and middle-income world. Defense of competitive
markets also demands state restraint from administrative pricing, unnecessarily distortionary
taxation, and barriers to domestic and international flows of goods, services, and people.
Restrictions on trade and immigration result primarily in the immiseration of populations in
low-income economies, inducing their increased overexploitation of renewable resources, in part due
to greater use of older and "dirtier" technologies. On balance, free trade is a friend to the poor and
to the environment in most of the world.
The fourth public good that governments need to deliver is a stable macroeconomic
environment for private decision makers. A key lesson of the generation of macroeconomic policy
making in Africa and Latin America from the mid-1960s through the mid-1980s is that lax fiscal and
monetary policies generate high and volatile inflation rates and weak financial systems, undercutting

J

23
incentives to save and invest, degrading real wages, and thereby hurting the poor and sparking
excessive natural resource exploitation.

Prudent macroeconomic management is central to

sustainable development (Gandhi 1996).
Necessary macroeconomic liberalization in most of the low-and middle-income world needs,
however, to be reconciled with the preexisting institutional shortcomings of low-income nations.
We live in what economists call a "second-best" world, i.e., one tainted by the imperfections inherent
to original sin. This is one reason why the first order of business in most of Sub-Saharan Africa and
many other desperately poor parts of the world should be micro economic and institutional reforms
to reduce transaction costs, extend property rights coverage, foster competitive markets, and increase
the supply of necessary public goods. In the absence of ancillary investments, macroeconomic and
sectoral liberalization reforms can cause significant and unanticipated environmental and human
injury (Barrett and Carter forthcoming; Maler and Munasinghe 1996; Opschoor and Jognma 1996).
Macroeconomic stability is necessary but not sufficient to sustainable development.
Finally, governments must ensure the existence of social safety nets that guarantee all
persons access to a minimum level of food, clean water, clothing, and shelter necessary for survival.
Where communities do not protect the vulnerable, the state must, out of compassion for both humans
and the environment. When their brothers and sisters will not support them, the poor tum to nature,
often in a quite unsustainable manner, through resource exploitation and procreation. Both theory
and empirical evidence suggest that social safety nets reduce the need of poor populations to resort
to environmental predation (Bluffstone 1995; Barrett 1998a; Barrett and Arcese 1998). Fiscally
strapped low-income country governments rarely can afford to provide complete safety nets, hence
the need for foreign assistance to poor communities worldwide in recognition of international

/

24
interdependency in ecological and economic systems. Unfortunately, the opposite is occurring;
already low-aid budgets are dwindling rapidly. While poor countries struggle to pay for food,
medicines, and school books to meet their populations ' most basic human needs, wealthy nations
that can afford to underwrite necessary investments in environmental protection have been
disgracefully slow to offer more than rhetorical support. Kenya, for instance, a nation with an annual
per capita income of less than $300, sacrifices approximately $200 million annually to conserve
biodiversity through protected areas, the benefits from which accrue globally and are enjoyed
especially by relatively wealthy westerners (Norton-Griffiths and Southey 1995). The costs,
meanwhile, fall disproportionately on Kenya's poorest citizens, the rural poor on the periphery of
protected areas. These folk have grown increasingly dissatisfied with unnatural parks and reserves
(Western, Wright, and Strum 1994; Akama, Lant, and Burnett 1995).

Community-based

conservation schemes aim to benefit local populations, but these schemes have generally proved
unsatisfactory to date (Wells, Brandon, and Hannah 1991; Brandon and Wells 1992; Western,
Wright, and Strum 1994; Barrett and Arcese 1995, 1998). Social unrest over conservation in
low-income countries will become a far more serious threat to stewardship in the coming years if
the wealthy, there and here, do not exhibit more foresight and compassion.
In order to undertake these activities successfully, governments need a bedrock of

competitive markets and firm social norms. Well-functioning markets reduce the temptation of
policy makers to meddle in resource allocation issues over which they possess comparative
disadvantage, instead encouraging concentration on the fundamental functions of government
outlined above. The failures of governments, especially but not exclusively in the developing world,
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have thus been both of commission and omission (Krueger 1990). The good news is that it seems
we have learned this lesson and are adapting accordingly, if slowly.

III. Concluding Remarks
Authentic sustainable development, in the form of stewardship for creation and the humans
therein, rests on a tripartite foundation. An interrelated economic/ecological system ordered by the
axioms of efficiency, community, and compassion depends on competitive markets, social norms
that emphasize the ecological virtues, and responsible governments. Each supports the other using
complementary informational channels and incentive mechanisms to influence human behavior. We
cannot advance one without the others. Pluralistic stewardship is a complex, multidisciplinary task.
The past decade's sharp movement toward competitive markets needs reinforcement,
J

especially through the provision of complementary institutional and physical infrastructure to reduce
transactions costs, promote domestic and international competition, and level the playing field
between market participants. But we should not pin all our hopes on markets; their role is important
but necessarily limited. We must simultaneously cultivate an ethic of individual and collective
responsibility, for creation and its constituent species, not least of which for our fellow humans.
Nash's (1991) ecological virtues deserve promotion throughout civil society, not least of which in
churches and schools. As more people think globally and act locally, contemporary society can
obviate the potential problems of imperfect markets and governments. Finally, governments need
to continue to extricate themselves from meddling in domestic and international trade, and focus
more on the essential tasks of providing public goods to improve information and understanding, to
facilitate market exchange by lowering transactions costs, to defend competitive markets, to ensure
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macroeconomic stability, and to provide social safety nets against exogenous shocks and transfers
across nations and generations. Participatory approaches to governance, based on the principle of
subsidiarity, are the keys to governance that advances the aims of efficiency, community, and
compassIon.
In summary, through markets, social norms, and governments, humanity can and must render

environmental stewardship compatible with survival for poor households, else we face catastrophic
loss of the human and nonhuman elements of creation in large tracts of the low-income tropics. The
past couple of decades have brought important advances in our understanding and operation of each
of those three basic institutions. While the challenges are great, there is reason for hope.
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Markets, Social Norms, and Governments In The
Service of Environmentally Sustainable Economic Development
The concepts "stewardship" and "sustainable development" arise frequently in contemporary
work on environmental protection and economic development. The considerable variation in the use
of the concepts, however, largely reflects the commentators' different and often hidden normative
axioms. This paper highlights several distinct, influential normative traditions and explains how
together these point toward lTIultiple institutional channels to meet contemporary environmental
challenges. My own perspective is that of a development economist with research interests in
agricultural development and poverty alleviation in poor communities. So in this paper I concentrate
on low- and middle-income countries-which account for 85% of the world's population and 76%
of its inhabited land mass-and hence on the "green" issues of renewable resource management that
./

disproportionately affect poor rural populations in the low-income world more so than on "brown"
issues of pollution and waste disposal more pressing to urban folk and the industrial world.

I. Distinct Normative Approaches

Economics, ecology, and ecumenism all derive from the Greek word oikos, meaning
household, but by no means share the same assumptions of what is essential or desirable. Our
disciplinary traditions often cloud our ability to understand why others might reasonably take a
different approach. This section briefly maps out some useful core principles of and fundamental
differences between economic, ecological, and ecumenical Christian perspectives on sustainable
development and stewardship. My goal here is to distill the core normative principles of these
perspectives not to provide a comprehensive survey.

2

A. Economics: Economists occupy privileged positions in contemporary policy debates, including
those concerning the environment. This is particularly evident in debates surrounding "sustainable
development," suddenly a central theme of the foreign policy of wealthy, industrial nations, of
development lending by multilateral organizations, and of the conservation strategies of international
environmental groups. Perhaps the most commonly cited definition of "sustainable development"
is that of the Brundtland Commission: "development that meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability offuture generations to meet their own needs" (WCED 1987, p. 43). This
definition summarizes a generation of economic thinking about environmental protection as
fundmnentally a question of optimal intertemporal management of natural resources.
But the element of the Brundtland Commission definition on which most scholars and
policymakers has seized is its explicit adoption of intergenerational equity as the core normative
/

axiom of sustainable development. It is easy to see why this mandates environmental protection.
Nondeclining future per capita incomes and standards of living depend on a nondeclining stock of
productive capital. Since some capital stock depreciates naturally, sustainable development requires
substitution for consumed, nonrenewable natural resources, and investment in those substitutes at
no less than the rate of simultaneous depletion of environmental resources (Georgescu-Roegen 1971 ;
Daly and Cobb 1989; Perrings 1996). As awareness of the complex fabric of ecosystems has
increased, however, economists' confidence in the substitutability between forms of capital has
dilninished. While some substitution possibilities are feasible (e.g., solar energy from photovoltaic
cells in place of energy produced by burning fossil fuels), we have become increasingly cautious
about environmental destruction and manufactured replacement as a sustainable pattern of resource
use. So economists have become increasingly cognizant that conservation of natural capital is
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central to intergenerational equity and to the optimal management of a resource.
But why emphasize intergenerational equity over intragenerational equity? If the goal is to
Inake possible for others what is possible for us -

a variant of the golden rule -

the principle

applies no less within contemporary society than across sequenced societies, a point regrettably
ignored in most contemporary writing on sustainable development. This oversight matters, since
the poor are both victims and agents of environmental degradation (Barrett 1996). Basing the
sustainable development ethic on intergenerational equity seems an arbitrary and incomplete social
philosophy.
The more useful economic principle embodied in the Brundtland Commission definition is
that ofParetian efficiency: we must not waste resources in the process of meeting the needs of the
present generation. A distribution is "Pareto efficient" if and only if no one could be better off
without making at least one person worse off. It is rare, however, to find changes that would not
make at least one person worse off, so the Pareto criterion in its strict sense is relatively useless.
More useful is the concept of "potential" Pareto improvements, combined with the compensation
principle, wherein gainers fully compensate the losers from a particular policy reform. I Pareto
efficiency and competitive market equilibria are logically equivalent under particular, common
assumptions. 2 This equivalency between competitive market equilibria and efficiency motivates
economists ' heavy reliance on markets as mechanisms for allocating scarce resources of all kinds.
Market prices playa central role in efficient allocation across space and time. But problems

1

Without compensation, the potential Pareto principle reduces to utilitarianism.

2 This relationship'S high status within the discipline is clearly reflected by its label: the
First and Second Theorems of Welfare Economics.
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arise under three common circumstances: in the presence of externalities that drive a wedge between
private and social valuation, in the absence of markets and observable prices, and in the face of
uncertainty against which one cannot fully insure (e.g. , the environmental impacts of irreversible
developlnent) .
Externalities, the absence of markets and observable pnces, uncertainty, imperfect
substitutability, and the dynamic interdependence of systems weaken the textbook case for free
markets but do not fundamentally alter the central importance of efficiency, as quite distinct from
the market mechanism used to foster efficiency. These merely complicate the computation of costs
and benefits necessary to establish the availability of potential Pareto improvements and create the
space for nonmarket institutions -

social norms and governments, in particular -

important role in efficient resource allocation.

to play an

The key normative criterion contributed by

economics is not the intergenerational equity but the more fundamental principle of efficiency.

'f

B. Ecology: The anthropocentric line of economic reasoning described above understandably
disturbs many ecologists, conservation biologists, and ethicists who find intrinsic value in nature
itself, not just instrumental value derived from nature's capacity to satisfy human needs and wants.
Objecting to environmental management based solely on human valuation of natural resources,
commentators routinely emphasize that humans are merely a part of a complex ecosystem that
influences us as much as we influence it. As a species, we have been relatively slow to recognize
the importance of community between humankind and otherkind and to therefore take greater care
in our treatment of the rest of Creation. Perhaps Sagoff(l995, p. 618) sums this sentiment up best:
"[t]he reasons to protect nature are moral, religious, and cultural far more often than they are
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economic." I would largely agree with this claim, while pointing out that while the reasons to
protect nature may be largely noneconomic, in a fallen world the means to do so rely (perhaps
distressingly) more on economics.
Irrespective of the rights of other kind, humans design and implement efforts to steward the
biosphere. Allowing for even the slightest human free agency and sinfulness, getting human
incentives right is a necessary condition to environmentally sustainable behaviors, regardless of the
morally appropriate allocation of rights. If we are to recognize the coevolutionary nature of all
Creation - humankind and otherkind - in all of the small, daily choices that collectively leave a
considerable human footprint on the biosphere, incentives have got to guide human behaviors in
appropriate directions.

Markets, influenced by governments and by the social norms of

communities, establish those incentives.
The anthropocentric arrogance rightly challenged by many conservationists is too often
mirrored by "green imperialism" on the part of conservation groups. The gazetting of parks in the
low-income world and various other initiatives born of western environmental campaigns too often
muount to little more than a wealthy population' s imposition of its values on a distant poor
population that bears most of the costs of conservation. As David Cumming of the Worldwide Fund
(

for Nature recognizes, "Only in Britain and America do people mistake animal welfare for
conservation. To force western values on African culture is cultural imperialism" (as quoted in The

Economist, Sept. 7, 1996, p. 15). The principle of humility is central to the concept of community.
Humility must be reflected in method as well. Mainstream economists tend to build
universal models based on micro-scale theories of the consumer and of the firm. Systems ecologists,
on the other hand, are more inclined to deemphasize individual members of species and to express
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concern about large-scale systems (Norton and Toman 1997). A more promising and recent
perspective emerges from hierarchical systems, which nest smaller scale systems within larger scale

?-

ones (Common and Perrings 1992· Holling 1992, 1994; Norton 1992), debunking the notion that the
J/

macrocosm mirrors the microcosm. An understanding of small-scale dynamics does not imply an
understanding of large-scale ones, nor vice versa.
The crucial normative axiom emerging from the ecological sciences is that of community,
and, derivatively, humility regarding our place in the biosphere. The very dependence of humanity
on the rest of creation and the intrinsic worth of nature should imbue us with appropriate caution.
An axiom of community does not, however, absolve us of the need to make conservation consistent
with humans ' imperfect aspirations nor of the need to satisfy aspirations in the most efficient manner
possible.

~

C. Christian: 3 There is no single "Christian" environmentalism today, but rather a rich diversity of
approaches. These are perhaps best recognized as the embodiment ofSt. Paul's (1 Corinthians 12)
insight that we are many parts of one body (Grizzle and Barrett 1998). The economic and ecology
paradigms crudely mapped above offer distinct, fundamental truths, but neither can stand fully on
its own.

Christian environmentalism is gradually evolving toward a more holistic approach

incorporating the ethics of efficiency and community and adding to these a cornerstone principle of
Christianity: compassion. Christ directs His followers to feel the pain of those who suffer and to
attend to their needs. Simply put, Christians must heal the suffering of creation, both its human and
nonhuman components. Compassion is a call to seek justice.

While I suspect the principles discussed in this section apply to many non-Christian
faiths, I am only able to speak competently to my own religion's perspective on the biosphere.
3

7
The axiom of compassion adds value those of community and efficiency. Recognition of
interdependence within a community, even of moral equality, stops short of motivating action to
remedy identifiable problems. Meanwhile, efficiency generally concentrates on the procedural
justice of competitive markets, ignoring issues of ex ante distributional justice (are initial
distributions fair?) and, as a consequence, of ex post distributional justice. 4

The axiom of

compassion fills these notable voids and, together with community and efficiency, creates a set of
useful axioms with which we can define and pursue environmentally sustainable economic
development.
The Christian tradition is also explicitly pluralistic, admitting multiple principles to guide
behavior. Jesus explicitly rejected moral monism when challenged to single out the greatest of all
commandments, replying instead that there are two fundamental principles (Mark 12:28-31). There
./

is considerable and growing support for a similarly pluralistic approach to contemporary
environmental issues (Norton 1995; Norton and Toman 1997; Barrett and Grizzle forthcoming ;
Grizzle and Barrett 1998).
Pluralism poses two major challenges. First, all parties must maintain a commitment to open,
respectful dialogue. Pluralism thus favors participatory methods to identify and analyze challenges,
and to propose, design, impleme~d evaluate prospective solutions. Decision making necessarily
becomes more local, with policy making done "from the bottom up," following the principle of
subsidiarity.

Environmental policy is becoming more participatory and more local, perhaps

especially in low-income agrarian communities in which global environmental challenges of

4 Barrett (1996, 1997a) advocates "fairness" theory as a way to include both distributional
and procedural justice considerations in economic theorizing about sustainable development.
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dictum "think globally, act locally" encourages community-based activism, and the evidence in both
the social and biological sciences is that pluralistic approaches are more effective than monistic ones
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in combating serious problems (Barrett and Csete 1994; Westemlet a . 1994).
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The second major challenge is the need for multiple accounting systems and decision rules
1,.---

corresponding to the multiple axioms underpinning choice (Norton and Toman 199j . ) This
necessarily requires parallel efforts at understanding the same phenomena or alternatives from
different perspectives. A pluralistic system will not likely be a least-cost means to make decisions
about the environment,5 but it is perhaps best suited to an adaptive management paradigm (Holling
1978), explicitly recognizing both the depth of our ignorance about inherently uncertain ecological
relationships and the considerable value of information that can help reduce that uncertainty.

"'{

D. Pluralistic Stewardship:6 The concept of "pluralistic stewardship" offers a helpful means to
reconcile the potentially complementary axioms of efficiency, community and compassion.
Stewardship holds that the possessor of a natural resource should behave as a custodian, using the
resource wisely but enjoined from destruction or disposal. Stewardship of creation, i.e., of the full
array ofhuman and nonhuman biota and abiota, combines efficiency and compassion, in its mandate
of wise resource use on behalf of all creation, with community in its denial of individual ownership
of all possible rights in property, lTIOst notably the right of destruction. Stewardship identifies

5 Note that "least cost" and "most efficient" are often mistakenly treated as synonymous
in the popular press. The most efficient solution maximizes net benefits (total benefits less total
costs), i.e., it exhibits zero net marginal cost, which is different than zero total cost.
6 This term originates with Barrett and Grizzle (forthcoming).
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possessors as managers, servants, and beneficiaries rather than as masters.
Stewardship necessarily limits property rights, denying the Lockean tradition of ownership
that lies at the core of western market economies, wherein a full suite of property rights (i.e. ,
including rights to destruction and disposal) derives from the application of human labor effort to
a hitherto unclaimed resource. Stewardship resembles more closely many communal tenure regimes
wherein exclusive rights to use and even to transfer a resource (particularly by bequest) accrue to the
person who first domesticates it. Property rights are social constructions; ownership must be
recognized and enforced within a society, whether by a state with police powers or by elders with
moral authority. There is nothing fundamental to rights systems that necessitates ubiquitous private
ownership of natural resources. This in no way denies the strong efficiency arguments favoring
private property rights associated with possession (see section II !A. on markets).

Pluralistic

stewardship merely limits the extent of those rights in order to recognize that compassion and
community are normative axioms not dominated by the axiom of efficiency.

~

I . Information Channels and Incentive Mechanisms
Articulating normative axioms is necessary but insufficient to advancing the goal of
environmentally sustainable economic development. Implementation must be carried out by humans
needing reliable and timely information available on which to base decisions, and facing incentives
that must induce them to behave in a manner consistent with socially agreed normative axioms.
Human decision making is framed by three broad classes of institutions that guide
information flow and incentives: markets, social norms, and governments. Each employs a different
enforcement mechanism to influence individual choice. Social norms invoke conscience and peer
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pressure, governments rely on police and taxation powers, and markets employ individual's
self-interest. These are thus best viewed as complementary institutions that society can hape so as

~q b

to facilitate economic development and environmental protection (Barrett 1997a b; Barrett and
Grizzle forthcoming). As Arrow et al. (1995 , p. 520) put it, "The solution to environmental
degradation lies in such institutional reforms as would compel private users of environmental
resources to take account of the social costs of their actions." This section discusses each of these
three broad institutions and why all three are necessary to advance pluralistic stewardship.

~

A. Markets: Markets are inherently pluralistic institutions. Indeed, markets are interesting and
important precisely because they encourage interaction and coordination within a society comprised
of individuals possessing different information, abilities, and preferences. Minority viewpoints have
as much standing in a market as majority viewpoints. By offering mutually beneficial exchange,
markets provide a means to articulate and accommodate plural interests. Individuals are part of a
complex system of production, consumption, and exchange, a material ecosystem of sorts. When
competitive, markets are one of the best known means to limit the concentration and abuse of
individual power.
Perhaps markets' most important function is to provide information essential to the efficient
allocation of resources to their most valuable uses through price signals of relative scarcity. The
prices heterogeneous people and firms are willing to accept or pay offer a useful summary statistic
for relative value in markets in which information flows freely. Complete competitive markets
generate price signals that yield Pareto efficient equilibria. Moreover, price signals induce much
nonrandom resource substitution, technological advance, and scientific discovery to improve
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resource management (Binswanger and Ruttan 1978). When markets function properly, increasing
resource scarcity naturally increases the returns to inventions that conserve, substitute for or discover
new stocks of threatened natural capital.
Increased relative scarcity occurs either because of increased demand or decreased supply.
As incomes and public awareness of limited ecological resilience increase, more people place greater
intrinsic value on environmental protection and demand for natural resources increases, driving up
their prices and encouraging their conservation. Similarly, increased perception of resource scarcity,
caused by depletion or by scientific findings that increase estimated minimum sustainable stocks
(ecological resilience), raises resource prices and encourages voluntary conservation. Both demand
and supply-side impulses encourage creative conservation innovations and the transfer of resource
use rights to those who best conserve the resource. This is apparent in the rapid and widespread
/

emergence of wildlife ranches in eastern and southern Africa, and in the increasingly common
purchase of land by environmental nongovernmental organizations (NOOs) that subsequently
convert the area into reserves. Competitive markets facilitate conservation.
Controlled markets, by contrast, distort prices, often discouraging conservation and
promoting unsustainable rates of resource exploitation. This is the experience of most centrally
planned economies. Industries in China and eastern Europe generated unprecedented air pollution
because they were directed to produce a certain volume of manufactures, without competition from
foreign imports, and using coal-generated energy priced below cost. Administrative pricing and
regulated production and trade patterns distort the information and incentives available to microlevel decision makers. When combined with ancillary interventions to ensure the most vulnerable
and resource-dependent members of society can share in the benefits, market-oriented economic
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liberalization can thus be socially and environmentally beneficial (Barrett and Carter forthcoming).
Competitive markets are not free nor do they emerge spontaneously; they are expensive
social constructions wherein individuals come together freely to transfer rights over the future value
of an object or service (Polanyi 1957; Bromley 1991). Competitive markets thus require low
transactions costs that permit a well-defined and defended system of transferable property rights, and
mature financial systems to facilitate exchange. Hence the intrinsic interdependency between
markets, social norms, and government.
Property rights make individuals accountable for their actions and thereby create incentives
for resource conservation or transfer. It is because the principle of accountability underlies an
effective system of property rights that state ownership generally fails , especially with a powerful
state not beholden to its constituents. Property rights are most effective when parties' rights can be
/

enforced and exchanged.

Any of several kinds of tenurial regimes-e.g., private property,

co-management, etc.--can offer clearly defined, protected, and transferable private usufructure rights
that foster efficient and equitable resource management (Baland and Platteau 1996; Hanna 1996).
The importance of transactions costs has long been recognized in economics (Coase 1960)
and is the central theme of the new institutional economics (Bromley 1989, 1991 ; North 1991 ;
Platteau 1994a, 1994b). Hill (1994, p. 124) points to transaction costs as "the reason for the
divergence between private actions and social consequences . . . . If we think of transaction costs
as the costs ofdefining and enforcing rights and carrying out exchanges, it obvious that these costs
are much higher with some resources, such as air, than with others, such as land. We fail to have
fully defined rights over certain resources because of high transaction costs, and in those cases the
unfettered interaction of individuals will not produce the socially desirable amount of activity"
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(emphasis in original). Higher transaction costs lead to less complete sets of property rights and less
efficient exchange of existing rights, with the consequence that more natural resources fall prey to
overexploitation. Transactions costs are particularly high in the low-income agrarian nations of the
tropics, leading to poorly defined and enforced systems of property rights, limited exchange
opportunities, incomplete and noncompetitive markets, and a dangerously rapid rate of deforestation,
desertification, biodiversity depletion, topsoil erosion, and air and water pollution.
Transactions costs are high in the absence of well-functioning communications and transport
networks - the physical infrastructure of an economy - or of a mature legal system and a free press
-

the institutional infrastructure of an economy -

to produce clear and consistent definition,

enforcement and transferability of property rights. Moreover, all well-functionir~g market systems
(

have depended on pervasive generalized morality (Bromley 1989; North

199(1)~vensky

1993;

Platteau 1994a, 1994b; Barrett 1997b). Interpersonal trust and social networks founded on trust
permit low-cost transactions, efficient division of labor according to comparative advantage, and
higher rates of investment and innovation.
Financial markets are of special importance because they permit borrowing and saving to
finance the purchase of durable property rights, and they enable individuals to insure against risks
that might otherwise impede investment and resource conservation. The absence of well-functioning
financial markets for saving, credit, and insurance often fosters excessive resource exploitation. For
example, pastoralists who cannot reliably save in or borrow from a banking system have a tendency
to overstock pasture, leading to increasingly fragile range ecology and greater risk of livestock dieoffs (Coppock 1994). Similarly, insufficient access to credit or insurance to allow peasant farmers
to mitigate price risk in staple foodstuffs increases incentives to undertake destructive slash-and-bum
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farming (Barrett 1998a). By contrast, debt-for-nature swaps executed by international environmental
NGOs have helped protect millions of hectares of ecologically valuable forest and rangeland in the
low-income tropics over the past decade only because secondary markets in sovereign debt emerged
in a competitive international financial market.
F or all their virtues of promoting efficiency and community, markets are not especially wellsuited to advancing the goal of compassion. This threatens the environment because the poor are
both the principle victims and the primary destroyers of natural capital in the low-income tropics
(Perrings 1989, 1996; World Bank 1992; Reardon and Vosti 1995; Barrett 1996, 1997a, 1998a;
Barrett and Arcese 1995, 1998). Deforestation, wildlife poaching that threatens biodiversity loss,
overgrazing that facilitates erosion and habitat destruction, and other unsustainable exploitations of
renewable resources too often result from one billion poor peoples' daily struggle to survive.
J

Attempts at resource conservation today may be futile in the absence of measures to combat poverty
since "for the environment, destitution is far worse than economic development" (Sagoff 1995,
p.616). More optimistically, the World Bank (1992, p. 1) asserts, "there are strong 'win-win'
opportunities that remain unexploited. The most important of these relates to poverty reduction; not
only is attacking poverty a moral imperative, but it is also essential for environmental stewardship."
The good news is that futile experimentation with state-directed resource allocation is now a thing
of the past and there are widespread good faith efforts at building authentically competitive markets
based on well-defined systems of property rights and low transaction costs. The movement toward
markets in the low-income world is desirable, well under way, and likely irreversible.

B. Social Norms: Social norms are the standards of conduct and moral judgements collectively
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espoused by individuals within a society. The cultivation and maintenance of norms that celebrate
the axioms of efficiency, community, and compassion are thus obvious means by which
contemporary society can operationalize stewardship. Norms are necessary to pluralistic stewardship
because a wildly uneven distribution of decision-making power endows a small subpopulation of
humans with virtually unchecked discretion over creation. Markets and governments can limit the
damage done directly or indirectly by this cohort (of which we are certainly a part), but those formal
institutions are rarely sufficient to prevent catastrophic, irreversible environmental damage.
Moreover, governments and markets are weakest in precisely those parts of the low-income world
where renewable resource depletion is of greatest concern.
Thankfully, many individuals and cultures already adhere to a strong ecological ethic,
although, regrettably, economic and governmental forces sometimes erode these traditions.
J

Individual conscience and social stigma can serve to enforce norms of efficiency, humility and
compassion where economic and legal institutions cannot. The more social scientists study social
behavior applied to common property resources, the more we realize the importance of what Cordell
and McKean (1992, p. 191) observe in Brazil to be an ethical code "far more binding on individual
conscience than any government regulations ever could be."7

Thus, a "central objective of

environmental protection movements must be to define and promote a holistic ecological ethic so
as to enlarge the population which values environmental protection and the satisfaction of basic
human needs sufficiently to generate an environmentally and socially sustainable society" (Barrett
and Grizzle forthcoming).

7 Ostrom (1990) and Bromley (1992) offer excellent summaries of this rapidly emerging literature.
Dasgupta (1993) offers an excellent discussion of the importance and power of internalized norms, and Putnam
(1993) offers fascinating insights on the value of persistent civic-mindedness in democratic society.

16
Social norms have direct and obvious value to stewardship because they encourage
individuals to exercise compassion and humility. Economic theory tells us that some "public" goods
will be severely undersupplied by markets because the provider of public goods cannot exclude
others from enjoying their benefits. Marginal private benefits are thus less than marginal social
benefits of public goods investment, leading to socially suboptimal supply. There are many
examples, however, of public goods that are plentifully supplied by private donor-investors: e.g.,
community leadership or houses of religious worship. Individuals often pay for such amenities out
of a sense of duty as much as because they are maximizing their own welfare (Barrett 1998b).
Just as the empirical evidence does not fully support the neoclassical prediction that public
goods should always and everywhere be severely undersupplied, so too does the evidence fail to
support the popular prediction that common property resources will always be overexploited.
Overexploitation of open access resources occurs much less so than "the tragedy of the commons"
predicts. A better understanding of why individuals voluntarily exercise restraint is of potentially
enormous importance to the task of pluralistic stewardship. Evolutionary game theorists are finding
that social systems exhibit multiple stable equilibria, including not only those characterized by the
tragedy of the commons, in which individualistic behavior leads to resource overexploitation, but
also a norm-guided society of cooperation, individual restraint, and decentralized enforcement of
codes of conduct (Platteau 1994a, 1994b; Baland and Platteau 1996; Sethi and Somanathan 1996).
The key to realizing the latter, preferable equilibrium is that a sufficient proportion of society acts
cooperatively so that this behavior persists in the face of idiosyncratic violation by a minority.
Hence, the importance of promoting ecological ethics of the sort captured in the popular
maxim "think globally, act locally." In the face of increased individual mobility that decreases
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communities' capacity to induce cooperative individual behavior by sanctioning transgressors, it
becomes all the more important to instill in people a strong self-directed ethic of stewardship.
Toward that end, Nash (1991) advances a set of nine "ecological virtues," which he describes as
"patterns of personal and social perspective and behavior that, if followed, can make ecological
integrity a reality."
The good news is that such virtues are being actively promoted in churches, schools, and
local gathering places throughout the world. There has been a stunning shift in perspective regarding
humanity's place in and responsibilities to creation in the past generation. Anyone who spends time
in elementary or secondary schools, in this country and many others, cannot help but come away
impressed by the depth and sincerity of the environmental stewardship convictions held and
expressed by today's children. While some of this innocent idealism will surely tarnish as they age,
I retain great hope that we are helping our children learn early the lessons we and our parents
discovered rather late: that we need to think globally and act locally.
Social norms also have instrumental value through their facilitation of competitive markets
and good governance. As discussed already, efficient markets depend on a generalized morality.
Although rarely recognized by those who most frequently invoke his writings, Adam Smith
advocated a market economy not because he believed in its inherent virtue, but because he believed
lllOSt people were sufficiently virtuous to make market exchange feasible and that the police power
of the state could satisfactorily contain the damage done by the rest. Indeed, in his Theory ofMoral

Sentiments, Smith emphasized the superiority of assistance "reciprocally afforded from love, from
gratitude, from friendship, and esteem" as the root of a flourishing society. Recognizing, however,
that "man has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren, and it is vain for him to expect
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it from their benevolence only," Smith saw an important role for self-interested behavior as well,
hence his famous "invisible hand" metaphor. In Smith's view, a market-based "society, though less
happy and agreeable, ... may subsist ... by a mercenary exchange of good offices accordingly to
an agreed valuation." The virtue of markets, in the authentic Smithian view, is that they are
participatory, encouraging free and frequent human interaction that induces innovation and requires
honest behavior to maintain associates' trust. Simply put, Smith saw a market economy founded
on social norms as more compatible with the other necessary ingredients of a moral society than the
feudal or mercantilist systems familiar to eighteenth century England.
The norms prevailing in a society also underpin its governance. Widely held perceptions of
what is fair behavior limit potential abuses of power. Procedural legitimacy is necessary for the
sustainability of any human institution. Violence, towards the poor or the environment, feeds on
silence; it is overcome through advocacy and dialogue.
Social norms in tum depend on markets and governments. While love is the greatest virtue,
it may also be the scarcest, and we must therefore economize on its use where we can. This is the
point of the earlier quote by Adam Smith in his famous argument for free markets, which lessen
individuals' dependence on others' benevolence. Moreover, competitive markets and participatory
governance facilitate regular human contact that helps feed compassion and a commitment to
pluralism.
Governments, meanwhile, help ensure satisfactory provision of public goods in information,
law enforcement, and education, which help shape and buttress the norms prevailing in a society.
The legal and regulatory systems of the state also articulate and enforce codes of conduct, thereby
setting uniform public standards on matters of broad agreement. Among the most important
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safeguards a government can defend are the rights to free speech and religious tolerance, for the
defense of minority views and interests is crucial to the persistence of authentically pluralistic
systems. This checks the tendency of social norms to mutate into ideologies that can become
oppressive rather than liberating.
Governments also have an important role in cushioning against shocks, both domestically
and internationally. The severe dislocations involved in rapid sociopolitical transitions in Europe,
Africa, and Latin America, and the apparent rapid rise in crime and predatory behavior are disturbing
examples of what can happen when governments become impotent in a time of swift change. Where
national governments have been unable to cushion their citizens from dramatic change, the
international community has a practical need as well as a moral obligation to assist. As economies
integrate internationally and communities become less isolated from external cultures, harmonization
of international codes of conduct becomes crucial to maintaining stable, cooperative social systems.
The easier it becomes to escape social sanction, the less likely is a system to evolve toward a normguided equilibrium in which individuals transcend purely self-interested welfare maximization to
behave in a socially optimal fashion. Isolationist policies are a clear threat to the establishment and
maintenance of universal norms that must underpin environmentally sustainable development.
Many of the most pressing contemporary environmental challenges-biodiversity loss,
deforestation, desertification, soil erosion-are most acute where markets and governments are
weakest. Individuals must nonetheless have an impulse to steward resources without the lure of
profit or the threat of government penalty. Hence, the urgent need to cultivate universal norms of
pluralistic stewardship within ourselves, our churches, our civic institutions, and our children.
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c. Governments: The traditional economic view is that the appropriate role of government is to
correct market failures and to provide public goods. Unfortunately, many states have failed to do
those two things well, with serious consequences, and as a consequence, governments are under
attack in most places. Nonetheless, governments have crucial roles to play in the task of pluralistic
stewardship. While improving the quality of governance is a desirable objective, we need to take
care not to destroy the credibility and authority of governments in the process of reforming them.
Markets founded on self-interested, optimizing behavior will generally not lead to an efficient
allocation of resources in the presence of externalities. Governments can eliminate externalities
through taxes or subsidies to equate private and social costs and benefits. Theory tells us taxes and
subsidies will usually be more efficient than regulatory prohibitions. But where uncertainty abounds,
then there may be a sound basis for regulation according to the precautionary principle (Bishop
1978). This principle is the basis for safe minimum standards to minimize downside risk associated
with potentially catastrophic events.
Public goods are a very special type of externality associated with goods that are "nonrival"
(many individuals can enjoy it without diminishing another' s consumption) and "nonexcludable."
Governments need to provide public goods that fulfill five important objectives: (i) to facilitate low
transaction costs that enable the definition, enforcement, and exchange of property rights; (ii) to
improve information on and understanding of the relationship between human society and the
broader ecosystems of which we are a part; iii) to defend competitive markets; (iv) to ensure
macroeconomic stability; and (v) to cushion society against shocks, providing social safety nets and
transfers as needed.

Having already discussed the provision of physical and institutional

infrastructure to reduce transactions costs, let us now tum to these other four missions.
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Reliable and timely information properly understood is fundamental to making efficient and
compassionate choices. Research and education are the principal means by which societies produce
information and understanding. The empirical evidence strongly suggests that basic research and
training is distinctly undersupplied by private sources, yielding extraordinarily high annual rates of
return to public research and training. The more we study ecosystems and their linkages to
socioeconomic systems, the more we learn about how resilient or fragile each system is to distinct
types of perturbations and the better equipped we become to steward creation. Recent initiatives to
integrate environmental sustainability questions fully into more traditional lines of research in
engineering and the social sciences deserve considerable attention and support. Governments must
be reminded regularly of the wisdom of investing in the public goods of research and education.
Governments must also defend the competitiveness of markets through active antitrust
.J

enforcement, now largely absent in the low- and middle-income world. Defense of competitive
markets also demands state restraint from administrative pricing, unnecessarily distortionary
taxation, and barriers to domestic and international flows of goods, services, and people.
Restrictions on trade and immigration result primarily in the immiseration of populations in
low-income economies, inducing their increased overexploitation of renewable resources, in part due
to greater use of older and "dirtier" technologies. On balance, free trade is a friend to the poor and
to the environment in most of the world.
The fourth public good that governments need to deliver is a stable macroeconomIC
environment for private decision makers. A key lesson of the generation of macroeconomic policy
making in Africa and Latin America from the mid-1960s through the mid-1980s is that lax fiscal and
monetary policies generate high and volatile inflation rates and weak financial systems, undercutting
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incentives to save and invest, degrading real wages, and thereby hurting the poor and sparking
excessive natural resource exploitation.

Prudent macroeconomic management is central to

sustainable development (Gandhi 1996).
Necessary macroeconomic liberalization in most of the low- and middle-income world needs,
however, to be reconciled with the preexisting institutional shortcomings of low-income nations.
We live in what economists call a "second-best" world, i.e. , one tainted by the imperfections inherent
to original sin. This is one reason why the first order of business in most of Sub-Saharan Africa and
many other desperately poor parts of the world should be micro economic and institutional reforms
to reduce transaction costs, extend property rights coverage, foster competitive markets, and increase
the supply of necessary public goods. In the absence of ancillary investments, macroeconomic and
sectoral liberalization reforms can cause significant and unanticipat d environmental and human
;------..
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injury (Barrett and Carter forthcoming; Maler and Munasinghe 1996 ~ Opschoor and Jognma )19 96).
~
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Macroeconomic stability is necessary but not sufficient to sustainable development.
Finally, governments must ensure the existence of social safety nets that guarantee all persons
access to a minimum level offood, clean water, clothing, and shelter necessary for survival. Where
communities do not protect the vulnerable, the state must, out of compassion for both humans and
the environment. When their brothers and sisters will not support them, the poor turn to nature, often
in a quite unsustainable manner, through resource exploitation and procreation. Both theory and
empirical evidence suggest that social safety nets reduce the need of poor populations to resort to

j;\
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environmental predation (Bluffstone 1995; Barrett 1998a; Barrett and Arcese 1998). Fiscally-

strapped low-income country governments rarely can afford to provide complete safety net " Hence
the need for foreign assistance to poor communities worldwide in recognition of international
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interdependency in ecological and economic systems. Unfortunately, the opposite is occurring;
already low-aid budgets are dwindling rapidly. While poor countries struggle to pay for food,
A..

medicines, and school books to meet their populations' most basic human needs, wealthy nations
that can afford to underwrite necessary investments in environmental protection have been
disgracefully slow to offer more than rhetorical support. Kenya, for instance, a nation with an annual
per capita income of less than $300, sacrifices approximately $200 million annually to conserve
biodiversity through protected areas, the benefits from which accrue globally and are enjoyed
especially by relatively wealthy westerners (Norton-Griffiths and Southey 1995). The costs,
Ineanwhile, fall disproportionately on Kenya's poorest citizens, the rural poor on the periphery of
protected areas. These folk have grown increasingly dissatisfied with unnatural parks and reserves
(i)t",r ltpu fAd 5&.v...t-CJ-"'-.-t(i) CA~ Bu.rlk~-t(
(Westerruet a . 1994.; Akam ea. 1995). Community-based conservation schemes aim to benefit
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local populations, but these schemes have generally proved unsatisfactory to date (Well et al. 199 ;
l+-f.: awl '5+-p.lV'l\.
0rL~ ''"\2)
Brandon and Wells 1992; Weste~et al. 1994; Barrett and Arcese 1995, 1998). Social unrest over
conservation in low-income countries will become a far more serious threat to stewardship in the
coming years if the wealthy, there and here, do not exhibit more foresight and compassion.

In order to undertake these activities successfully, governments need a bedrock of
competitive markets and firm social norms. Well-functioning markets reduce the temptation of
policy makers to meddle in resource allocation issues over which they possess comparative
disadvantage, instead encouraging concentration on the fundamental functions of government
outlined above. The failures of governments, especially but not exclusively in the developing world,
have thus been both of commission and omission (Krueger 1990). The good news is that it seems
we have learned this lesson and are adapting accordingly, if slowly.
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III. Concluding Remarks
Authentic sustainable development, in the form of stewardship for creation and the humans
therein, rests on a tripartite foundation. An interrelated economic/ecological system ordered by the
axioms of efficiency, community, and compassion depends on competitive markets, social norms
emphasizing the ecological virtues, and responsible governments. Each supports the other using
complementary informational channels and incentive mechanisms to influence human behavior. We
cannot advance one without the others. Pluralistic stewardship is a complex, multidisciplinary task.
The past decade's sharp movement toward competitive markets needs reinforcement,
especially through the provision of complementary institutional and physical infrastructure to reduce
transaction costs, promote dOlnestic and international competition, and level the playing field
between market participants. But we should not pin all our hopes on markets; their role is important
but necessarily limited. We must simultaneously cultivate an ethic of individual and collective
responsibility, for creation and its constituent species, not least of which for our fellow humans.
Nash' s (1991) ecological virtues deserve promotion throughout civil society, not least of which in
churches and schools. As more people think globally and act locally, contemporary society can
obviate the potential problems of imperfect markets and governments. Finally, governments need
to continue to extricate themselves from meddling in domestic and international trade, and focus
more on the essential tasks of providing public goods to improve information and understanding, to
facilitate market exchange by lowering transaction costs, to defend competitive markets, to ensure
macroeconomic stability, and to provide social safety nets against exogenous shocks and transfers
across nations and generations. Participatory approaches to governance, based on the principle of

J
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subsidiarity, are key to governance that advances the aims of efficiency, community and compassion.
In summary, through markets, social norms, and governments, humanity can and must render
environmental stewardship compatible with survival for poor households, else we face catastrophic
loss of the human and nonhuman elements of creation in large tracts of the low-income tropics. The
past couple of decades have brought important advances in our understanding and operation of each
of those three basic institutions. While the challenges are great, there is reason for hope.
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